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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Half a decade has now passed since a series of protests, most commonly referred
to as the Arab Spring, erupted across the Middle East and North Africa. In late
December 2010, the world watched with anticipation as the beginning of these uprisings
started rapidly unfolding in Tunisia after street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself
aflame due to his ongoing indignation towards the oppressive actions regularly inflicted
upon him by police forces. By resorting to self-immolation, one of the most extreme
forms of political expression, he single-handedly drew statewide recognition towards the
corrupt policies and injustices of the government. His death was the catalytic force that
prompted thousands of Tunisians to take to the street demanding respect, democratic
reforms and equal rights for all citizens. This pivotal moment sent sheer panic throughout
the entire MENA region n, as other Arab leaders befittingly feared that the infectious
contagion of mass mobilization would eventually spread to their own countries, and it
most certainly did. The unifying theme that initially linked all the movements together
was dissidents’ strong opposition towards longstanding, exploitative authoritarian rule
and their intense desires for better social, economic and political rights.
Background of the Problem
As five years have gone by since the beginning of this historic period where
citizens residing in this vicinity of the world actively engaged in protests against their
governments, clear observations can finally be made which highlight how the aftermath
of these uprisings significantly vary from country to country despite originally stemming
from shared grievances that transcended across state borders. The Arab Spring has ended
the reign of certain country’s most enduring dictators and ignited widespread violence in
others, while a handful of regimes successfully maintained their stronghold on power.
This has resulted in a multitude of studies attempting to explain which causal
mechanisms are responsible for these divergent outcomes. A common trend that has
developed within the academic community has tended to focus on the countries in this
region that exhibit several shared characteristics in order to juxtapose them against one
another to find the few crucial traits in which they differ. By doing this, scholars aim to
directly pinpoint the infinitesimal, but nevertheless substantially important dissimilarities
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that exist amongst these states that display seemingly identical qualities, as they are then
believed to be the explanatory variables needed that can account for the contrasting
outcomes of the protest movements.
For instance, numerous research inquiries have revolved around trying to
understand the reasons why the transition to democracy proved more successful in
Tunisia than in Egypt as they each have a shared history of maintaining a secular order,
similar population demographics with a Sunni Muslim majority and once the uprisings
broke out, the military personnel in both countries each chose to back the protesters
whilst abandoning their loyalty to the regime. Also, before the events of late 2010
occurred, it may have appeared to the outside world that Egypt and Tunisia, although
well-known autocracies, were at least governed by more liberal constitutions that
permitted multiparty elections and bestowed citizens with civil liberties. However, these
images portrayed to the international community were merely cosmetic, as those rights
were simply overturned by these regimes who then meticulously engineered their
consolidation of power over the presidency and ruling parties. 1 But now that an ample
amount of time has passed since the protest movements erupted, key differences have
been identified between the two countries which are thought to be the reasons behind
Tunisia’s successful transition to democracy compared to its alleged counterpart, Egypt.
The factors that are attributed to these disparate outcomes are the size and the role of the
military in each country, in addition to the manner in which the incumbent regimes
decided to treat Islamist groups enmeshed within the general public. 2 In Tunisia, the
military was purposely kept diminutive and frail unlike the highly populous Egyptian
army that plays a significant role in society. Also, although both countries banned
Islamist organizations from legally assembling, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was
given more leeway to publicly gather and vie for seats in parliamentary elections, albeit
as independents, whereas in Tunisia the law was strictly abided by and known Islamists

1
Leila Hilal, “Charting Transitions in the Middle East: Lessons Learned from Tunisia and Egypt,” Insight
Turkey 14, no. 2 (2012): 2.

Paul Kubicek and Laura K. Landolt, “Opportunities and Constraints: Comparing Tunisia and Egypt to the
Coloured Revolutions,” Democratization 21, no. 6 (2014): 989.
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were completely suppressed or exiled. 3 Therefore, during the transitional period in Egypt
after Mubarak stepped down, the Islamists cozied up to the military who were in grave
fear of loosing their entrenched role in the economy which prompted SCAF, the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces, to hijack the constitutional reform process to protect their
monetary interests while simultaneously granting the Muslim Brotherhood exemption
from the input of the secular oppositionists.4 Whereas the Islamist party in Tunisia, the
Ennahda, were more eager and willing to work with civil society in ousting regime
loyalists from participating in the process of restructuring the constitution which is cited
as the reason why Tunisia has had a more successful transition to democracy than Egypt.
Another popular research topic pertains to the uprisings that occurred in Libya
and Yemen, as scholars have focused their efforts on making sense of why NATO forces
intervened in the former case but were absent in the latter despite all the similar features
between these countries as well as their nearly identical responses towards brutally
repressing the protest movements that took place within their borders. In both nations,
rampant corruption is omnipresent, tribal affiliations are of utmost importance even
taking precedence over religious and political propinquities and finally, citizens are
presided over by nepotistic governing structures. 5 In addition to this, the Libyan and
Yemeni armed forces were instructed to blatantly slaughter unarmed citizens believed to
be against the regime. But the United Nations Security Council only gave the go-ahead
for NATO forces to actively intervene in Libya under the guise of “humanitarian
intervention” to help protect civilians. Various speculations have attributed this decision
to Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi’s overall unpopularity with a great number of
world leaders who were eagerly awaiting his demise. Whereas in Yemen, the Saleh
regime was viewed as an ally to the West and an avid supporter of the ‘war against
terror’. 6 Other studies have alluded to the presence of petroleum reserves as the real
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Leila Hilal, “Charting Transitions in the Middle East: Lessons Learned from Tunisia and Egypt,” 3.

Michael Makara, “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring,” Democracy and Security 9,
no. 4 (2013): 347.
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Zoltan Barany, "The Role of the Military," Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 33.

Berdal Aral, “Roaring in Libya, Whispering in Others: UN Security Council’s Posture During the ‘Arab
Spring’,” Insight Turkey 16, no. 1 (2014): 187.

6

7

reason why NATO decided to get involved in the domestic affairs of Libya, but not
Yemen.
Statement of the Problem
One highly underexamined case is that of the unlikely pair, Bahrain and Syria. On
the surface, comparing these countries based on their similarities may seem like a
paradoxical task, but after thoroughly examining their attributes, they actually have more
in common than what meets the eye. Both nations encompass specific qualities that
substantially distinguish them from the rest of the countries engulfed by the Arab Spring.
In short, Bahrain and Syria have highly heterogeneous populations that are split along
ethnic and religious lines, both ruling regimes are minority groups challenged with
governing over a dominant majority and finally, they each responded in a similar manner
to the originally peaceful protests by briefly opting for mild concessions quickly followed
by violent repression. Also, during the beginning months of the uprisings prominent
external actors remained initially silent and unwilling to vehemently speak out against the
atrocities being committed by the Bahraini and Syrian military forces against innocent,
unarmed civilians legally exercising their right to protest.
But mentioning the role of external actors would not be complete without
discussing the part played by the security apparatuses of the Gulf Cooperation Council in
Bahrain’s uprising, as certain scholars have accredited their intervention as the sole
reason why Bahrain was able to crush the momentum of the protest movements, but this
is not the case. The 1,500-membered troop, comprised of men from the UAE’s military
and the Saudi Arabian National Guard, was sent to Bahrain to provide the essential
backbone needed to free-up the Bahraini Defense Forces from safeguarding important
infrastructure so they could focus all their efforts on brutally repressing their own
citizens. 7 The coercive forces of the regime were the ones mercilessly striking
demonstrators and eliminating them from the streets by any means possible. This is why
the GCC intervention is not responsible for “saving” Bahrain from breakdown. At best,
the crackdown on protesters might have taken a longer time without GCC support, but

Fawaz A. Gerges, ed. The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 337.
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nonetheless the state still would have triumphed. 8
For that reason, the empirical puzzle still remains as to why Bahrain was
successful at quelling oppositional forces while Syria descended into the onset of civil
war?
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to uncover the causal mechanisms which are to blame
for the drastically different outcomes in Bahrain and Syria. Given their unique, shared
country-specific characteristics, the identical responses they took against protesters and
the similar reactions from the international community during the initial phases of the
unrest, it seemed exceedingly probable to predict that the aftermath of the uprisings
would have at least born a slight resemblance to one another. Since this has evidently not
been the case, it makes for an interesting research opportunity to investigate how two
highly overlooked factors, repression and signals, can impact whether or not a protest
movement will result in civil war onset or not.
The decision to focus on the role of repression stems from the fact that only in
Bahrain did this misuse of state power manage to subdue dissidents while in Syria it
escalated the level of violence to the onset of civil war. Therefore, the specific types of
repression tactics carried out must vary on certain aspects which produced these
divergent outcomes. The reason for concentrating on signals, understood as statements of
support or condemnation by external actors, has to do with the way
in which they commented on the atrocities being committed by the state security forces in
both countries. As the protest movements progressed, prominent foreign actors sent
signals of support to the al-Khalifa regime in Bahrain while in Syria several denounced
the behavior of the al-Assad administration and threatened to act if other nonviolent
approaches were not adopted to mitigate the rising hostilities. These opposing reactions
affected the strategic calculations of both opposition groups differently which made them
either more eager or reluctant to resort to violent means to achieve their goals.
In order to address the reason why civil war broke out in Syria but not Bahrain, a
comparative case study will be carried out to test for causation regarding the independent
8

Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform, 86, 90.
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variable, repression, as well as the intermediate variable, signals from external actors, to
see if they had a deterring or escalatory effect on the protest movements which led to the
absence or presence of civil war onset.
Significance of the Study
This research is important because it will contribute to the civil war onset
literature by analyzing the understudied roles that repression and signals play in
influencing the likelihood that a country will descend into this type of intrastate conflict.
By comparing the cases of Bahrain and Syria, it allows for a more comprehensive
assessment of the impact that the independent variable of repression and intermediate
variable of signals have on transforming protest movements into or away from the onset
of civil war. Previous studies have assessed a multitude of diverse factors thought to play
a part in the commencement of violence that ensues between a government and its
domestic opposition.
The most generic explanations center around the greed versus grievance debate,
as proponents of the former are more focused on the opportunity for rebellion whereas
the latter emphasizes the level of citizen’s overall dissatisfaction with the state which
propels people to take up arms against their government. Another commonly cited factor
thought to trigger civil war onset is the role of identity, but this has been rather difficult to
prove empirically. Ethnicity and religious affiliation are the two most popular
components of this umbrella term and although they are influential tools for mobilizing
forces they have not been found to be the root cause of conflict. This is primarily because
it is challenging to ascertain that a civil war occurred based purely on issues of identity,
as the real cause is actually due to a shared struggle over a lack of specific socioeconomic resources which generates onset. An additional trend has been to highlight
certain attributes of a country that are believed to make them more susceptible to
experiencing this kind of intrastate violence. Some popularly mentioned features are
related to demographic factors such as population size or density, mountainous terrain
and the presence of natural resources. All of these aforementioned reasons represent the
most generally cited factors thought to trigger civil war onset. Although these structural
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models are useful for predicting which countries are more prone to civil war, they lack
the ability to determine when this type of conflict will break out.
This thesis will take a process-oriented approach in understanding how the onset
of civil war occurs by exemplifying how this type of intrastate conflict builds up through
a dynamic interaction between a state, its dissidents and external actors to reach this
threshold of violence. Analyzing these lesser known causal mechanisms of repression and
signals hopes to provide policymakers with the tools necessary for better predicting
when, and not simply where, hostilities in a specific country are in danger of escalating to
the onset of civil war.
Repression is a vital independent variable to study because whenever a
government perceives a challenge to its authority they are likely to respond with
oppressive measures against their adversaries. This is known as the “Law of Coercive
Responsiveness” which almost guarantees that a regime will react to an emerging
uprising with violent force. What is interesting though is that, historically, the use of state
repression has led to mixed results, as in some instances it was successful at defeating the
opposition while in others it accelerated the violence to the onset of civil war. Therefore,
it is crucial to understand that state repression is not a homogenous type of behavior but
rather one that entails multiple forms of coercion which have a varying impact on the
outcome of protest movements. Investigating the multiple varieties of repression will
pinpoint the types which are responsible for increasing or decreasing the momentum of
uprisings.
The other fundamental intermediate variable that will be examined are signals
which will be defined as statements made by external actors. Signals are important
factors to pay attention to because they reveal extremely telling messages to governments
and their domestic opponents as to what side should except to receive foreign support if
the conflict metastasized into a civil war. Previous research has tended to treat this type
of internal violence as purely domestic in nature, neglecting the transnational dynamics
that play a crucial role in effecting the direction of protests. Although signals from
external actors will vary based on the type and target of repression tactics being carried
out, they still contribute to causing a variation in the dependent variable which is the
presence or absence of civil war onset. In addition, assessing the role of signals will allow
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international relations scholarship to be applied to intrastate conflict studies to offer a
more in-depth conception of how third-parties can influence the direction of protest
movements into or away from civil war onset.
Primary Research Question
To reiterate, the primary research question that will be addressed in this thesis, is
what were the specific causal mechanisms that resulted in the different outcomes of the
Arab Spring uprisings that took place in Bahrain and Syria?
Hypotheses
The first hypothesis is that the differences in the type and target of repression are
the reasons why the Bahraini regime was able to quell dissidents while the Syrian forces
only upped the level of mobilization throughout the entire country resulting in the onset
of civil war.
The second hypothesis is that the specific type and target of repression caused a
variation in the signals from external actors, determining if they were sent in support of
the regime or its opposition which influenced both parties’ decision making processes in
deciding to come to mutual agreements or opt for incurring the costs of going to war with
one another.
Research Design
The methodology that will be used in testing these two hypotheses is a
comparative case study of the uprisings that occurred in Bahrain and Syria during the
timeframe of January 2011 to January 2012. The decision to compare only these two
cases was due to the fact that no other Arab Spring countries exhibited the unique
attributes as the ones found in Bahrain and Syria which provided a rare opportunity to
examine the highly understudied roles of repression and signals from external actors.
Although the comparative case study approach is constrained by the “many variables
small N” problem, if properly applied it can compete with rival methods. The most
similar systems design is used to match Bahrain and Syria based on all the important
common features they share which are not central to this study, in effect controlling for
them and thus reducing the many variables issue. This technique has an advantage over
12

large-N, cross-case methodologies where each and every single relevant control variable
is assigned a precise ranking commonly based on strong assumptions regarding the
underlying causal relationship. 9
Material from primary source data will be critically analyzed and compared
against one another to test the hypotheses in order to see if the independent variable of
repression and the intermediate variable of signals have explanatory power in accounting
for the different outcomes of the uprisings that took place in Bahrain and Syria. The
resources explicitly concerning the repression tactics of both regimes will be obtained
through country-specific reports on Bahrain and Syria from the Human Rights Watch,
Amnesty International, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, the UN
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and the U.S. State Department
during the timeframe from January 2011 until January 2012. In addition, datasets from
the Political Terror Scale’s archives, which measures the level of state violence, will be
used as well.
The type of signals to be examined are formal statements made by external actors
and international organizations that proclaimed either their support or condemnation of
the regimes or their opposition that will be obtained through textual documents, countryspecific reports, public speeches and adopted resolutions or attempted resolutions. These
groups consist of one intergovernmental organization, the United Nations, two regional
organizations, the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council and one
governmental organization, the U.S. State Department. Also, statements from two of the
most powerful heads of state during this timeframe, current President of the United
States, Barack Obama and former King of Saudi Arabia, the late Abdullah bin Abdulaziz
Al Saud, will be analyzed because of the critical role they played in shaping the direction
of the uprising through their vocal declarations which either supported or denounced the
Bahraini and Syrian regimes or their opposition.
The signals from external actors in Iran and Russia are not included in this
analysis for several reasons. The first is that the Russian regime basically did not
acknowledge or even bother to really comment on the situation in Bahrain and Iran
John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007), 131-133.
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eventually followed suit in favor of focusing their attention on the Syrian uprising
instead. Therefore, the signals each country made about Bahrain had relatively little
impact on the direction of the protest movement in this country. In Syria on the other
hand, they were the only two staunch supporters of the al-Assad regime who wanted to
see Bashar remain in power but were significantly undermined by the rest of the
international communities’ efforts which signaled to the oppositional forces that they had
a plethora of outside supporters that would aid them should the situation continue to
escalate. This is why although the Iranian and Syrian regimes sent costly pro-government
signals in the forms of monetary aid and arms shipment that, according to signaling
theory, should cause dissidents to back down and refrain from further conflict with the
state, was not the case because they were outnumber by almost all states in the
international system who were adamantly against the Syrian regime and continued to up
the number of cheap anti-government signals that overpowered the costly signals from
these two countries.
Theoretical Framework
The foundational theories used to guide the direction of this research are
escalation and signaling theory. They were chosen because they yield greater explanatory
power in demonstrating how the roles of repression and signals can influence and cause
civil war onset to ensue compared to other theoretical perspectives more focused on
greed versus grievance type factors. Within escalation theory lies the inflammation
hypothesis which predicts that civil war onset is the result of the specific type and
intensity of the repression tactics carried out by the state which mobilizes citizens to up
their rebellious efforts. 10 By responding to initially nonviolent movements with violent
force the state causes its dissidents to view normal channels for initiating political change
as closed while simultaneously increasing their grievances and thus, their willingness to
fight. Therefore, repression is an intricate element that is enmeshed in the multifaceted
process leading to the onset of civil war which should not be ignored. The key to

Armstrong II, David A., Christian Davenport and Mark I. Lichbach, "Conflict Escalation and the Origins
of Civil War" (Working Paper, University of Maryland, 2006), 35, 36.
10
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understanding how this type of intrastate violence emerges lies within identifying the
escalatory path which leads from one form of conflict to the next. Moving on to the
second framework, signaling theory places an emphasis on the often overlooked
transnational features that can influence whether or not a country will descend into civil
war onset. When foreign actors make simple statements showing their support or
disproval of a regime or its opposition based on their actions towards one another, it
affects the decision making processes of both parties in deciding whether or not to come
to a mutual agreement to end the rising tensions or opt for resorting to continued violence
instead. 11
Limitations
Since it is nearly impossible to apply a strict application of the most similar
systems design, as it would require that cases be selected based on a specified number of
factors that only varied in their outcome and one single explanatory variable, which is
why a looser application of this was employed when choosing to compare Bahrain and
Syria. Despite not being able to systematically match the cases on all the relevant control
variables, it still permits for a thorough examination to be conducted to see if a causal
relationship exists between the independent and dependent variables.
Delimitations
This study is solely focused on the uprisings that occurred in Bahrain and Syria
during the timeframe from January 2011 until January 2012 because it was within this
period that the protest movements were either successfully defeated or the onset of civil
war had begun. Limiting this study to one year instead of stretching it out over a five-year
span will provide more informative data on how repression and signals from external
actors caused the varying outcomes in each country. Furthermore, the decision for using
these two factors as the casual mechanisms thought to shape the way protest movements
will turn out is because several other explanatory variables have been constantly
reproduced in multiple studies leading to relatively similar conclusions. The cases of
Clayton Lynn Thyne, "Cheap Signals, Costly Consequences: How International Relations Affect Civil
Conflict" (PhD. dissertation, University of Iowa, 2007), 30-38.
11
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Bahrain and Syria were chosen based on the several shared country-specific
characteristics that they both exhibit, such as their highly heterogeneous populations and
the fact that both regimes are minority groups governing over a dominant majority, which
made them unique compared to the rest of the Arab Spring countries. Also, the manner in
which they both responded to the originally nonviolent protests with brutal repression and
the initial reluctance of the international community to publically condemn the barbarities
being committed made them an even better case for comparison to understand how the
aftermath of both uprisings have led to the completely different situations each country is
in today.
Definition of Terms
Although the onset of civil war is difficult to operationalize, for the purpose of
this thesis specific criteria will be used in order to attempt to give it a more concrete
definition. One of the first factors is that an armed conflict must take place in a country
with a minimum population of 500,000 between the national government and at least one
insurgency group. Secondly, effective resistance by both sides is a must and the antiregime rebels must be militarily organized as well as having publically stated political
aspirations. 12 But one of the biggest problems in determining when the onset of civil war
occurs is related to the specific death threshold that must be exceeded for a conflict to be
labeled as such. An additional problem arises in regards to whether or not only battlerelated deaths should be included or if civilian casualties should be counted as well.
The standard model for measuring the intensity of internal conflict focuses on the
total number of deaths to see if it exceeds a specific threshold, normally 1,000 casualties
in a given year, as another vital factor that determines when the onset of civil war occurs.
But using the absolute number of deaths instead of the number of casualties standardized
by population size biases findings against conflicts in smaller nations as this threshold is
applied to countries whose population sizes are extremely heterogeneous. 13 Therefore,
12

Nicholas Sambanis, “What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational
Definition,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004): 816.
13

Hannes Mueller, “Growth and Violence: Argument for a Per Capita Measure of Civil War” (Working
Paper Series, no. 756, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, 2014), 2.
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although this method shows the correlation between the structural characteristics of
countries and the onset of civil war, it does not accurately capture the specific countryby-country variations that might lead to onset in certain cases. As a solution to this
problem, using the number of deaths in relation to the population size of a country during
a one-year period would capture the violence intensity in casualties per capita instead of
the absolute number of overall deaths. This would make it less likely to overlook armed
conflicts taking place in smaller nations that produce fewer deaths but are nonetheless
dramatically significant. 14 But establishing a proper per capita measure is difficult and
labor intensive.
Therefore, the death threshold that must be exceeded in Bahrain is relaxed to 25
battle-related and civilian casualties in a given year while in Syria it is increased to 1,000
to better accurately account for the variance in their population sizes. Although Bahrain’s
population is only 600,000 while Syria’s is 22 million, it is still possible to compare these
countries and see if the death thresholds in each amount to the number needed to be
labeled as the onset of civil war. Now although the Bahraini Independent Commission of
Inquiry recorded 35 deaths during the uprising starting from February 14, 2011 until
April 15, 2011 in which 18 civilian deaths were attributed to security forces, 1 police
officer death was attributed to the Bahraini Defense Force, 3 security force member
deaths were attributed to demonstrators and 8 civilian deaths were not attributable to any
specific perpetrator, it does still not qualify as the onset of civil war. 15 This is because it
does not meet the other criteria previously mentioned above, such as the fact that an
armed insurgency group must have formed and been actively engaged in violent conflict
with the state. While in Syria, towards the the last few months of the uprising, the Free
Syrian Army was established which actively and effectively targeted members of the
Syrian regime’s security forces, killing a significant amount of them. By the end of
December 2011, the death toll was estimated around 5,000 which included members from

14

Ibid, 11-12.

15 15

Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of
Inquiry (Presented in Manama, Bahrain, November 23, 2011), 220.
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the regime’s security forces and insurgents caused by battle-related death in addition to
civilian casualties as well. Therefore, although the international community did not
immediately declare the situation in Syria as a civil war, does not mean that it did not
begin during this timeframe.
Overview of Chapters to Come
This thesis will consist of six main chapters. In Chapter 2, a review of the
literature will be presented to show how previous researchers have used other variables in
their efforts towards explaining how the onset of civil war occurs. A more focused
examination will be given to the literature that is more relevant in regards to the
independent and intermediate variables of repression and signals. Chapter 3 will consist
of a detailed description of the theoretical perspectives adopted followed by a discussion
of the methodology and research design which will include how the data was collected,
defined and analyzed. Chapters 4 will be solely dedicated to the information on Bahrain
while Chapter 5 will be designated exclusively for the material found on Syria. Finally,
Chapter 6 will provide a brief overview of the entire thesis, a few concluding remarks
about the level of success of the study and future recommendations for upcoming
scholars interested in understanding the causes of civil war onset.

18

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In the post-WWII era, civil wars have become the most common type of conflict
occurring in more than 70 countries since 1945 and lasting on average for a period longer
than seven years. 16 This type of intrastate violence that takes place between a government
and at least one opposition group has detrimental, long-lasting effects on the wellbeing of
a country and its people. The direct consequences can be seen in rising death tolls of
civilians, through the destruction of infrastructure and arable land while future effects
will likely result in a decline in foreign investment and economic growth, in addition to
the enduring psychological impact on citizens living in these unfortunate conditions. But
civil wars do not only effect the internal dynamics of a state, as the influx of refugees in
surrounding countries can create severe, problematic situations for host nations as they
may not be financially quipped to house over a specified number of people within their
borders. Also, the probability that refugees will become stricken with communicable
diseases significantly increases due to their poor living conditions and lack of access to
food or water which creates another risk that neighboring countries must endure. 17
According to the United Nations Human Rights Council, by the end of 2006, the number
of people they had listed under the moniker, “persons of concern” (which included
refugees and internally displaced persons) almost hit the 33 million mark, an outstanding
number to say the least. 18
Why the topic is important
Understanding the causes leading to the onset of civil war is imperative because
of the devastating consequences they have domestically as well as the security threat they
pose to nearby countries. Their destructive nature and inherent persistence overtime
throughout various states has led scholars to vigorously study the causal mechanisms that
produce this type of intrastate conflict. Therefore, it is important to continue to carry out
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these analytical investigations to garner a more comprehensive understanding of the
multiple causes thought to trigger civil war onset with the hopes of preventing these
situations in the future.
The Purpose of the Literature Review
After the Cold War, a surge in studies regarding the onset, duration and outcome
of civil war were guided by new theoretical perspectives that were all tested using
different empirical designs which claimed to hold the answers as to why countries
become engulfed in internal warfare. Due to the multitude of variables that were put forth
during this period, it is beneficial to have a solid background knowledge about these
various explanations. This review will therefore highlight the most commonly cited
theories and their approaches towards testing them empirically. It will then exemplify
how studying the highly overlooked factors of repression and signals from external actors
will fill a gap in the literature.
Scope of the review
This review will focus specifically on the civil war onset literature while
disregarding other work more focused on explaining the duration and outcome of civil
war. It will be organized thematically based on the prominent theoretical perspectives
that have shaped the way people understand and study civil war today.
Organizational Pattern of the Review
The first theoretical frameworks that will be discussed are the ones which initially
paved the way for civil war onset scholars. Although they have largely been discredited
now, it is vital to know the history of how the current literature came to be. Therefore, a
brief overview of greed and grievance theories will be reviewed to emphasize how they
were more fixated on using structural characteristics to explain the onset of civil war.
Then it will transition over to newer work dedicated to showing how repression and
transnational features can also produce this type of intrastate conflict as well.
Causes of Civil War Onset
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Grievance Theories
Throughout the number of grievance-based theories regarding the onset of civil
war, the fundamental message of them all is that when citizens become so discontent with
the unjust polices of the government they decide to mobilize and take up arms against the
state in order to initiate their desired changes. One of the earliest theories of this kind
dates back to the 1970s with Ted Gurr’s relative deprivation theory. He developed this
concept when he was attempting to address the reason why men rebel. According to him
it is through a three-stage process in which political violence ensues. The beginning
phase occurs when citizens start to acquire extreme dissatisfactions with the state and
overtime these frustrations eventually morph into highly politicized issues. This is the
tipping point that engenders citizens to engage in violent confrontations with the regime.
The root source of these grievances stem from what Gurr terms, ‘relative deprivation’,
defined as “a perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value
capabilities”. 19 In other words, when a person feels robbed of something in which they
believe they are entitled to over others who already possess whatever that something may
be, they are experiencing feelings of relative deprivation.
Another more recently developed grievance-based theory which furthers Gurr’s
position is that put forth by Frances Stewart in his research on horizontal inequalities and
civil war onset. He defines horizontal inequalities as disparities that exist among
culturally-defined groups that provoke people to rally against the state to change the
specific policies in place that negatively impacting their lives. Although Stewart is
cognizant that inherent cultural differences alone are not enough to initiate this kind of
violent outbreak as his theory acknowledges that when fighting occurs along ethnic lines
the underlying reasons can almost always be reduced to inequalities that exist in the
distribution of economic, political and/or social power. 20 Racial, religious, ethnic and
even immigrant categories are classified under the umbrella term of ‘culturally-defined
groups’ which may feel the impact of these horizontal inequalities. In the economic
sense, these inequities can be found in the differences of income or employment
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opportunities, in the social realm as disparities in the accessibility to various public
services and in the political sphere as a lack of entryway into any government position of
power. The onset of civil war will occur when these culturally-defined group identities
coincide with the perceived inequalities that they harbor towards one another which
mobilizes them to forcefully unite against the regime. 21
These two grievance-based theories that were built on the concepts of relative
deprivation and horizontal inequalities helped pave the way for civil war onset studies
because they identified some of the reasons why citizens would opt for engaging in
violent combat with the state due to their perceived injustices. But the studies that have
been conducted on their behalf are measuring levels of actual inequalities that exist,
while these theories specifically state that people decide to go to war with the state based
on their own perceptions of inequality and their relative position towards others in
society, rather than on actual observed measures of inequality. It is extremely difficult to
collect, measure and conceptualize citizen’s perceived grievances which is why these
types of theories have lost their prominence in the field today.
Greed Theories
Civil war onset theories that are founded on the idea of greed as a motivating
factor, posit that this type of intrastate conflict will occur when rebels’ perceived benefits
are greater than the costs of rebelling against the state. Greed-proponents have measured
these concepts in a number of various ways, but this review will only focus on the
research conducted by two of the most well-known experts on the topic, Paul Collier and
Anke Hoeffler, whose main goal is to illustrate that greed or economic-based factors
elicit civil war onset not citizen’s grievances. In their studies, the cost of rebellion,
probability of successful rebellion and benefits of rebellion are all proxied by numerous
variables in order to draw inferences about the rebels’ expected behavior and motives. 22
For potential rebels, the cost of rebellion is determined by two factors, the first
being how much income they would loose if they decided to go to war which is proxied
by the current per capita income of the state. The second aspect pertains to the costs of
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coordination as secrecy and trust are necessary conditions when plotting a rebellion and
these are measured by population size and cultural distinctness which proxied by ethnolinguistic fractionalization, the likelihood that two randomly selected people in a country
will be from different ethnic groups. The likelihood that rebels are victorious hinges on
the governments capacity to defend itself, in other words, on the extent of their military
expenditure that is determined by the size of its taxable base which is then, in turn,
proxied again by per capita income and natural resource endowments, calculated by the
share of primary exports in the GDP. 23 The outcomes of a successful rebellion will result
in either a complete takeover of the state or secession from it (the desire to secede is
proxied by population size). If the former takes place, then the expected benefits of
rebellion lie in the capacity of the new rebel government to repay their supporters which
is proxied yet again by the taxable capacity of the current regime in power. But if the
latter situation transpires, then the taxable base of the pre-secession state is not the right
basis for the future benefits of rebellion as distributional considerations become more
crucial instead. 24
The results indicated that four factors were central in predicting the onset of civil
war. Higher per capita income reduced the probability that this type of intrastate violence
would occur as rebels would be disinclined to sacrifice lager wages to engage in combat
against the state, especially since the duration of any conflict remains unknown. The
presence of natural resources increased the likelihood of onset, but after a certain
threshold, reduced the chances of it. Although, the authors claimed that the overall effect
of having natural resources was more of a burden than a blessing, except in rare instances
in which a country can avoid rebellion through monetary concessions only made possible
by the exceedingly high amount of rents they receive from their abundant natural
resources. The next finding was that countries with larger populations were more at risk
for experiencing a civil war and this was attributed to greater desires for secession. While
the authors did point out that this finding may be open to interpretation as population size
was also used to proxy coordination costs, they simply stated that aspirations for
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 50
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secession predominate. Finally, the effect of ethno-linguistic fractionalization was
measured and the results were different from the initial prediction which assumed that
higher levels would increase the prospects for civil war onset. Instead, this did not have
any effect on the likelihood that this kind of domestic conflict would ensue as countries
with almost complete homogeneous societies and ones with highly fractionalized
populations showed no probable indication that this would increase or decrease their
chances for experiencing a civil war. Rather, what was shown to increase a country’s risk
for incurring a civil war was not ethno-linguistic fractionalization per se, but the degree
of that fractionalization which facilitates rebel coordination. 25
In order to test the explanatory power that greed-based theories hold in predicting
the onset of civil war, researchers must first identify quantifiable variables for
opportunity. Sometimes this task is relatively straightforward, for example, if one wanted
to measure the levels of economic inequality that exist within a country, they could use
the GINI coefficient of income which shows how income is distributed throughout a
nation’s population. But several variables cannot be measured this easily which forces
researchers to use calculable proxies instead and this becomes very problematic down the
line. First off, certain proxies that are intended to represent the opportunity for rebellion
can just as easily be used as indicators of grievance. Greed-based theories state that rebel
recruits must be compensated and this compensation has to be greater than their income
foregone when they decided to quit their jobs and enlist as rebels. Therefore, rebellions
are believed to occur when foregone income is remarkable low but this could also be
interpreted as an objective economic grievance. 26 Secondly, most of what they are trying
to measure is really not being measured at all by the specific proxy variables they chose
and thus, it becomes very difficult to decipher what they are actually capturing instead.
For instance, the presence of natural resources are thought to increase the chances that a
country will experience a civil war as they provide potential rebels with the opportunity
for extortion. In reality, this is not based on concrete, observable data regarding rebel

25

Ibid, 569.

Laurie Nathan, “The Frightful Inadequacy of Most of the Statistics: A Critique of Collier and Hoeffler on
Causes of Civil War” (Discussion Paper no. 11, Crisis States Research Center, University of Cape Town,
South Africa, 2005), 4.
26

24

behavior but simply inferred from a mere correlation between primary commodity
exports to GDP and civil war onset. 27 The problem with greed-based theories is that they
are essentially going around in circles as they are predicated around assumptions of
rebels’ behavior and motives which are then identified by structural indicators and
quantifiable proxies that are statistically analyzed along with the occurrence of civil wars
in which once again new assumptions are made about rebel’s behavior and motives. This
makes their variables of interest lack true explanatory power as they do not accurately
identify any real causal mechanisms that can trigger the onset of civil war. Although,
these theories are still useful in providing information about the structural characteristics
of a country that can increase their chances of experiencing a civil war in the future, such
as having a large population, low levels of per capita income or abundant natural
resources, to name a few.
The literature needs an in-depth exploration into other causal relationships that
exist between certain understudied variables and the probability of civil war onset which
are not related to the structural characteristics of a country or citizen’s grievances.
Examining the roles of repression and signals from external actors will help fill this gap.
Repression Theories
Repression-based theories bring something new to the literature which has been
predominately overwhelmed by structuralist accounts of civil war onset that center
around the notion that these types of conflicts simply “break out”. 28 Other researchers are
starting to take a process-oriented approach towards the study of civil war onset which
suggests that conflicts of this magnitude must build up over a period of time through an
ever-changing interaction of violence between a state and its dissidents. The use of state
repression is said to be the key in uncovering when this sort of intrastate conflict will
occur based on micro-level units of observation between a regime and the oppositional
forces against it which adds a temporal dynamic to the literature that was previously only
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able to predict where conflict was likely to erupt. 29 Within studies of civil war, there are
several competing theories all attempting to explain exactly how repression causes onset.
One particular study conducted by Nicolas Rost attempts to show how human
rights violations can lead to onset of intrastate violence. He defines human rights
violations in terms of infringements by the state on its citizens’ personal integrity rights
which are specifically listed as instances of torture, political imprisonment,
“disappearances”, and extrajudicial killings. These variables are tested in multivariate
models to assess their influence on the likelihood of civil war onset. 30 But what he is
particularly interested in is linking state weakness to a higher probability that a state will
use violent repression tactics against its dissidents. Indiscriminate repression is said to
cause civil war onset and be used more by weak states for several reasons. Since these
countries have little resources, their police forces are highly inadequate and therefore
they have trouble collecting intelligence to carry out targeted repression on those directly
involved in rebelling against the state. Also, they may not have the economic resources to
accommodate opposition’s demands and since they do not want to appear even weaker
than what they already are, they opt for indiscriminate repression. 31 The general
conclusion was that when state weakness and human rights violations are both present in
a country the risk of civil war onset is extremely high. The idea is that when weak states
use indiscriminate violence it leads to civil war because it drives civilians into the arms of
rebel forces, giving them the strength they need to cause a noteworthy level of damage to
the regime. But the author acknowledges that these types of repression tactics may simply
be a strategy used by governments to respond to a rebel group, meaning that repression is
merely a part of the escalatory process leading to civil war and not the sole cause for it.
This research was beneficial to the literature because it addressed the concept that
certain aspects of repression such as the type being carried out may increase the
likelihood of civil war onset, especially in weak states. The problem is that repression
was treated as both the cause of civil war and as part of the process leading up to it.
29
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Further investigations are needed to address the endogeneity issues that arose when
studying repression’s impact on the risk of civil war onset that will be able to prove
causation and not just correlation. It remains a difficult task to pinpoint the exact causal
mechanism linking these two together, especially when dealing with large-N empirical
models. Comparative case studies can offer a better insight into this relationship as they
can meticulously trace the process of conflict escalation from minor struggles to all-out
civil war.
Now although the previous study recognized that civil war was a process of
interactions between the state and its dissidents in which indiscriminate repression led to
onset, the decision for using this specific type of repression method was based on
structural characteristics of a state. Weak states were supposedly more likely to use
indiscriminate repression because they lacked the intelligence required to carry out
targeted attacks and the resources needed to accommodate the opposition’s demands. 32
But research conducted by Joseph K. Young attempted to tackle the question as to why
some weak states have never experienced a civil war while others have. He proposed a
new conceptualization to measure state capacity which included the level of societal
support in addition to the amount of resources a state has in determining whether or not
repression will be used on dissidents and civilians. Both studies assume that repression
causes civil war but the decision of leaders to use it are based on different factors. Also,
the former study was more focused on the idea of state weakness and it did not include a
comprehensive description of the process of violence that occurs between states and its
dissidents. The model proposed by Young aimed to clarify this by emphasizing the
micro-foundational motives of the state, civilians and dissidents which leads to civil war
onset. 33
States, as rational actors, try to use the least costly actions to ensure they remain
in power while still receiving support from the majority of the population. But when
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leaders are concerned about their job security they will use repression to elicit greater
compliance with their preferred policies and to quell any behavioral challenges to their
authority. 34 In reality, this has a backlash effect as the more a state uses repression the
less societal support it receives which in turn causes a rise in dissident activity. Dissidents
can engage in a number of tactics to protest against the unjust policies of the state, such
as demonstrations or any kind of violent disruptions that directly oppose the regime. The
more dissident activity there is the more a state will up the level of brutal repression and
this is how the process of violent interactions is established that will eventually lead to
civil war onset. Therefore, this can explain the reason why some weak states never
experience civil war because they have high levels of societal support which reduces the
need for them to use repression to carry out their polices. 35
This research added to the literature a theory of how the process of interactions
between a state and its dissidents could progress into violent confrontations. Although
former studies linking repression to civil war onset all believed that civil wars occurred
through a process of violence they did not directly identify how the course of this
relationship changed overtime leading to civil war onset. By adding the concepts of
societal support and a leader’s job insecurity as the causal mechanisms that influence a
leader’s decision to use repression or not filled this gap. But it becomes problematic
when trying to measure these concepts as they cannot precisely be quantified so proxy
variables are needed instead. Societal support was measured according to the term
relative political capacity which is supposed to capture a state’s capabilities to collect
resources and control society. But in certain highly repressive regimes, governments face
no difficulties in collecting taxes, implementing their policies and maintaining order. To
truly measure societal support, opinions of citizens are needed to accurately assess the
level of support a regime has not through proxy variables. Job insecurity which attempts
to depict the likelihood that a leader will remain in power is calculated based on the time
former executives were in office and on the rate of economic growth. But these measures
also cannot adequately be used as substitutes for a leader’s feelings on whether or not
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their position in office is in jeopardy. Lastly, to test these theories a quantitative analysis
was applied in which the spatial domain was across 162 countries, making it extremely
difficult to actually assess the process of violence that occurs between a state and its
dissidents in such a large number of cases, especially using statistical analysis. It would
be better to critically examine these theories using only a few countries in order to see if
the level of societal support and job insecurity have explanatory power.
Prior studies have all agreed upon the notion that increased state repression leads
dissidents to up their rebellious efforts thus causing civil war onset, except they all had
their own mechanisms to determine whether or not a state would use violent force. But
newer work claims that escalation has been indirectly measured and only considered in
isolation from other accelerating processes that can also cause civil war onset. Also, these
studies are trying to stress the importance of where protests occur as this can produce a
different escalatory process and elicit varying responses from a regime. One study by
David Armstrong II and Christian Davenport puts forth three hypotheses regarding
escalation processes that can all lead to civil war onset and which have largely been
ignored in previous work.
The first hypothesis is the one most cited in studies of repression’s impact on civil
war onset, the inflammation hypothesis, which claims that civil wars occur because state
repression triggers dissidents to up their violent efforts. The incapacity hypothesis says
that when a state cannot successfully apply repression, dissidents will mobilize at an
increasing rate leading to civil war onset because the weakness of the regime presents
them with the opportunity for rebellion. In this sense, the level of repression is believed
to be the best way to measure this opportunity structure because of the direct effects it has
on citizens and upcoming protest movements. Lastly, the ineffectiveness hypothesis
states that civil wars occur when state repression has no deterring effect on dissidents as
they perceive the state to be weak despite the fact that they are sustaining the costs of
using brutal force, dissidents still continue to up their level of violent activity. In addition
to this, the study proclaims that it is not just the kind of dissent that occurs, such as
nonviolent or violent uprisings, but the locale of this activity as well. They distinguish
this to mean areas where low-level conflict occurs in the pre-civil war period that takes
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place in either rural areas or urban ones. 36 According to them, special attention needs to
be paid to the various strategies adopted by dissidents because it has relevance for
existing theory and can effect how states interact with them depending on their preferred
tactics of rebellion. Dissidents in the rural country side are thought to use more guerilla
warfare type strategies to topple the regime while those in urban areas are said to resort to
anti-government protests instead.
To test these theories, they examined 149 countries over a span of around 24
years using statistical analysis to see if the three escalatory processes for onset could all
be observed. They operationalized their variables for the concepts of inflammation,
ineffectiveness and incapability. The level of repression was based on the political terror
scale measures and thought to represent the inflammation hypothesis. The guerilla war
variable simply stood for whether or not the presence of this type of activity was present
in previous years and represented the concept of incapability. Lastly, the ineffectiveness
hypothesis was operationalized as a variable for increased dissent proxied by rises in the
level of anti-government demonstrations or riots. They then measured the levels of
repression, dissent and guerrilla war in the previous four years in the countries that
experienced a civil war. Although their efforts were amicable it is difficult to
operationalize such concepts of inflammation, ineffectiveness and incapability. Simply
because a government does not choose to use repression against protestors does not
necessarily mean that they are incapable of doing so. Also, it does not directly measure
the precise actions taken by dissidents and regimes that would show in greater depth how
the process of escalation occurs. It assumed that those in the countryside were using
guerilla warfare tactics while those in the city took to the streets in protest, but this is not
always the case. Repression may not always be the best way to assess the political
opportunity structure because certain regimes will choose to respond to protestors in a
nonviolent fashion and accommodate the desires of the opposition. Lastly, there was no
distinction made on whether or not the repression carried out by the state was on civilians
or combatants, which is a crucial component to be aware of when studying the effects of
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repression on civil war onset.
Viewing civil war onset as a process of state and dissident interactions has led to
two competing theories within studies assessing the role of repression and protest
movements. One set of scholars treat state repression as an independent variable and
examine its impact on rebellion and domestic conflicts. The other group considers
repression as the dependent variable in which states will apply it once protests and
uprisings start becoming more violent and widespread. 37 In reality, any observable
outcomes of domestic conflict ranging from peaceful negotiations, to successful
deterrence or increasing levels of violence are determined by the actions of the
government. If a state chooses to repress an upcoming protest movement, it is based on
their presumption that it is easier to suppress lower levels of conflict before they reach
higher stages of violent activity. 38 The problem with this is that the use of state
repression on protest movements have led to mixed results in the literature, as in certain
instances it has proven to be an effective deterring mechanism while in other cases it has
escalated violence to the level of civil war onset. The question then, needs to be reframed
to not focus on whether or not repression has the capacity to quell oppositionists or
radicalize them, as it has the capacity to do both, but rather under what conditions does it
produce these different outcomes. 39 This is where it becomes critical to determine who
the protestors are and what strategies they are employing to achieve their desired policy
outcomes. If a government decides to resort to repression, it is important to be aware of
the specific tactics they use against dissidents as this has a direct impact on either
increasing or decreasing the escalation to civil war onset.
Protestors are ever-changing their strategies in response to the governments
actions towards them. At first, repression of oppositionists may be effective but only up
until a certain threshold in which higher and higher levels of repression will actually
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become counterproductive for the regime. 40 If nonviolent protestors are brutally targeted
by their government then this will decrease the level of the groups nonviolent activity,
while simultaneously increasing their level of violent activity. Research conducted by
Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl had similar findings to this concept as well. Once
nonviolent demonstrators become casualties of a regime’s brutal repressive forces it
mobilizes the population to act on their behalf and increases the recruitment pool for
rebels looking to gain more support. 41 This decreases the cost of collective action as
many citizens want justice for the atrocities that were committed against innocent
activists who were legally exercising their right to protest. Therefore, when looking to
determine when state repression has an escalatory effect on dissident activities, it is vital
to address if the opposition is peacefully protesting or whether they are using violent
means to achieve what they want. Another aspect that is also important to keep in mind
when assessing the likelihood that repression will trigger civil war onset is to look at the
type of repression being carried out, meaning whether it is selective or collective in
nature.
Philip Hultquist published a study assessing the effectiveness of collective
repression as a counterinsurgency technique. What was found is that when indiscriminate
violence is carried out by a regime it increases the probability that an escalation to civil
war onset will occur. When states use indiscriminate repression tactics against their own
people, they do not bother to distinguish between those who were actively involved in
either violent rebellion and those who were simply innocent bystanders, violent force is
applied to everyone equally. Under these conditions, citizens view normal channels for
political expression as closed and they come to the conclusion that even if they did not
participate in these uprisings their safety is at risk which causes them to join the
opposition. 42 This is how repression can lead to civil war onset depending on the type
and target these actions are carried out on. Since this research was conducted using a
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cross-national study to determine repression’s effect on conflict escalation it is only able
to produce a generalizable finding. Also it looked at the impact indiscriminate repression
had on an already armed insurgency so future studies should focus on the effects of this
type of repression on unarmed protestors. Case studies and small-N research designs will
have better accounts of how exactly this process works by looking at individual instances
of repression instead of using statistical analysis over a large number of countries.
In the literature it is hard to come across research projects that utilize small-N
designs to assess the role of repression on civil war onset, although luckily, few do exist.
One study, which was only a part of Kirssa Cline Ryckman’s dissertation, put forth an
escalation process model to show how repression leads to the onset of civil war in which
she used empirical data from the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings to test her hypotheses. The
process leading up to a civil war requires five steps, first a protest movement must form,
then it needs to gain significant strength, next it will switch its orders from calling on the
government to modify specific policies to demanding regime change, then these
dissidents will transform into a rebel group and finally the government must respond with
violence in return. 43 In this sense, repression only works in the opposite favor of the
regime as it mobilizes larger portions of the population to join rebel groups since they no
longer feel as if they are safe. Therefore, the dependence on violent repression tactics
only works to escalate the conflict to the level of civil war onset.
Figures from 17 countries in the Middle East and North Africa which were
engaged in the Arab Spring uprisings were analyzed. The statistics on these occurrences
were collected from major world publications from the Lexis-Nexis database and were
then transformed into sequences of events that were compared against each other in order
to form clusters that were similar in nature. These results were then evaluated against the
escalation process model to see if they followed the five steps hypothesized to lead to
civil war onset. If countries with similar events were clustered together and their protest
movements advanced along the five phases, then the hypotheses were deemed as
supported. To determine if a movement gained strength, regular weekly protests with
over 10,000 participants had to be observed and conveyed in the articles that were
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accessed. To assess when the uprisings switched their goals to demand regime change
also had to be reflected in the reports that were utilized for this study. If a movement was
powerful and calling for the country’s top leaders to step down, then the government’s
strategy in responding to these proclamations was coded depending on whether or not
they used repression or accommodation to quell these rising tensions. Lastly, in instances
in which the regime responded violent force, it was necessary to determine if the protest
movements metastasized into rebel forces which was verified by news articles where
such organizations declared themselves as such. The sequence of events was based on
three types of responses from the government which were either accommodation,
repression or a mixture of the two. By organizing these in the order in which they
occurred allowed for the specific responses to be greatly detailed regarding the number of
times they were employed and how long they were carried out for. Once these events
were clustered together, a symmetrical matrix was produced in which a cluster analysis
could then be performed to group these sequences together based on their similarities. 44
The distance for what was to be considered to as “similar” was eased in order to allow for
two or more sequences of events to be clustered together and this process was repeated
until all sequences were linked.
The results showed that in three countries involved in the Arab Spring uprisings
(Libya, Syria and Yemen) in which the governments resorted to harsh repression tactics,
it escalated the conflicts towards civil war onset. The one case which did not fit this
mold, was the uprising that took place in Bahrain. The reason cited for why this country
did not become engaged in a civil war of their own was due to the fact that 1,500 troops
from Saudi Arabia and the UAE came to their “rescue”. According to this study they
were responsible for clearing out all the protesters at Pearl Roundabout which essentially
saved the Bahraini regime from succumbing to civil war. Because of this factor, Bahrain
was put into its own cluster and did not follow down the path predicted by the escalation
process model. According to hypothesis 4b, in certain rare circumstances where protest
movements escalate to this phase in the model they experience some kind of irregularity
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that allows repression to eventually work. 45 In this case, the troops from Saudi Arabia
and the UAE are this irregularity. This is why although the Bahraini regime engaged in
harsh repression against a strong movement, the rebel group did not form.
But this thesis seeks to downplay how the GCC intervention contributed to the
reasons why an armed insurgency did not form in Bahrain by showing how the specific
type of repression tactics carried out by the state’s security forces combined with external
factors played a bigger role behind why this kind of organization was never established.
Transnational Factors and Civil War
Traditionally, the literature on civil wars have tended to study this political
phenomenon through a closed-polity approach which largely disregards external factors
as having a causal effect on the probability that a country will descend into this type of
intrastate conflict. Instead, transnational factors are thought to influence the duration and
outcome of civil wars, but not the onset as this is attributed to specific economic and
political factors occurring inside a state. External intervention in civil wars, for
humanitarian and/or military purposes, have been studied to assess their impact on the
duration of conflict while the role of external forces has also been analyzed to understand
their role in civil war resolution, as certain scholars have predicted that the presence of a
third party will increase the likelihood that a government and its opposition will come to
negotiated settlements. But recent studies have started to examine the external factors
which make the prospects for civil war onset more likely. One study conducted by
Kristian Skrede Gleditsch found that the the likelihood of civil war onset is heavily
influenced on whether or not surrounding countries are already engaged in civil wars of
their own, taking notice of the spill-over effects of this type of violence. 46 Other
transnational factors have also been cited as increasing the likelihood of civil war onset,
such as the size of diasporas in neighboring countries which are thought to be more
willing to economically support their ethnic kin in staging a successful insurgency against
their government.
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Today, civil wars can be strongly influenced by transnational factors which have
been largely understudied in the recent literature. Although research in this area is
starting to thrive, very few of these studies have attempted to advance the current
findings on the causes of civil war onset by aligning their work with international
relations scholarship. By applying IR theories which explain how interstate wars occur to
intrastate conflicts will offer a more comprehensive image of civil war onset by
addressing the role external actors can play. Bargaining theories and rationalist
explanations will provide the conceptual framework needed to make these connections.
Therefore, a brief review of these two international relations theories will be presented
alongside the literature which has already attempted to incorporate these perspectives into
their studies on civil war onset. To assess the transnational features of civil war, signals
made by external actors will be defined and explained in order to show how they can
influence the likelihood that this type of intrastate violence will occur.
Bargaining Theories and Interstate War
When conflicts erupt between states it is usually attributed to differences
regarding policy choices or the allocation of resources. 47 In order to try and mitigate the
conflict from escalating to a full-blown war several attempts are made in which the
countries engaged in these disagreements try to come to a negotiated settlement. Thus the
bargaining process begins in which states will try and influence other’s expectations
about what they are willing to compromise on. In instances like these, features of
cooperation and conflict can be seen as all actors have incentives to come to a mutual
agreement versus the costs of going to war but they have contrasting ideas on the specific
conditions of the agreement. Sometimes states will make a commitment to carry out a
specific action in the future which is expected to make others succumb to terms of their
liking. Promises to provide certain benefits to countries may be made if they agree to
another’s stipulations, but if states are still unwilling to budge than others may threaten to
use force against them. In this case, all parties to the conflict must assess the credibility of
these claims and decide whether or not they will change their position. War is averted
Clayton Lynn Thyne, “Cheap Signals, Costly Consequences: How International Relations Affect Civil
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when states are confident that other states will carry out their threats so they decide to
come to a final agreement that is tolerable to everyone, but when states are uncertain
about the willingness and capabilities of other states to actually go forward with their
threats they will resort to violent means to settle their disputes. 48 By going to war states
are able to become aware of others capabilities and resolve which will then enable them
to finally come to a mutually agreed upon settlement.
Rationalist Explanations and Interstate Wars
Going to war is costly for all parties involved which is why rational actors try to
avoid it by all means necessary, but in certain instances wars end up taking place anyway.
A common rationalist explanation for the occurrence of interstate wars is due to the
anarchical nature of the international system in which no supranational governing
authority exists to enforce the law and therefore nothing is in place to prevent a state from
using force and going to war with another. 49 But the lack of a global “police force” does
not explain why this prevents states from negotiating agreements in which both would
prefer to the alternative of fighting. Also, under the conditions of anarchy states must rely
on their own self-help to ensure their survival. A state may simply be trying to make
itself more secure by increasing its military capabilities but this essentially makes other
states less secure which can lead to a security dilemma and eventually war. Although if
the first state did not anticipate this domino effect would occur resulting in a costly war,
then the problem is one of miscalculation not anarchy in which bargaining could have
been used to resolve it. 50 Other rationalist explanations focus on the logical reasons states
would engage in preventive and preemptive wars. If a hegemonic power is loosing its
influence and it believes that it will be attacked in the near future by a rising power than
this is said to make a preventive war rational. The mere shift in the balance of power is
used as the explanatory factor that causes states to go to war but this does not consider
how both parties could construct an agreement that leaves both better. In the situation of a
preemptive war, both states would prefer to live in harmony with one another but states
48
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can never be certain if another’s commitment to this is credible. Therefore, a state may
decide to attack another before it reneges on its promise of maintaining peace. A largely
unexamined concept in rationalist explanations on the causes of interstate war is that of
threat perceptions which has only recently taken the intentions of a state as a source of
threat that is independent of military capabilities. 51 When a state is uncertain about the
willingness of another to carry out their threats it may increase the likelihood that they
will go to war because they may not want to risk being unprepared against a possible
imminent attack in the near future. Therefore, the lack of information regarding the true
intentions and capabilities of another state can be the driving force leading to interstate
wars.
Both Theories of Interstate War
A common thread intertwining these two theories together is the fact that in both
instances, privately held information regarding one’s capabilities and intentions creates
the conditions for uncertainty which leads to the onset of war. From the rationalist
perspective, if both parties in a conflict accurately represented this information then the
prospective loser would decline to fight. While the bargaining theory predicts that if both
states were truthful about their intentions towards one another then they would be able to
reach a mutual agreement over the contested issue at hand. When states threaten others,
whether they are serious or not, they want to convince everyone else that they intend to
act in hopes of making others yield to the goals they are trying to achieve. But when other
parties to the conflict are uncertain over the credibility of these threats and another state’s
actual capabilities wars are likely to ensue.
For this reason, it is plausible to conclude that if a country’s foreign policy
choices to go to war are receptive to and influenced by the perceptions they have
regarding another state’s intentions, then these overt threats from one state to another can
convey information. 52 There are two types of threats employed to influence states’
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perceptions of others, one being verbal warnings and the other actual physical threats.
Normally, these spoken threats are simply designed to signal the capacity and intention of
one state to inflict harm on another and usually take the form of “if-then” conditional
statements. Whereas physical threats are non-verbal signals that intend to communicate
the seriousness of one’s intent to punish undesirable behavior such as mobilizing troops
or creating new alliances. 53
Interstate Signaling
When states attempt to inform another of their intentions using threats, this is
referred to as a signaling game in international relations. One player, the sender, tries to
convey information about the future moves they will make in response to the possible
moves the receiving state may take. 54 One thing is certain regarding communication
between states in the international system and that is the fact that several possible courses
of action are available for the threatening state to make, but the problem is that the
receiving state is unsure which they will choose. When disagreements arise, all states
involved may hope for an agreement to be reached over the costs of going to war, but
somewhere along the line there is a conflict of interest at some level over how this
settlement is to be reached. These differences in interests allow scholars to explore
instances of strategic information transmission, where the sender may attempt to bluff
and exaggerate their willingness to carry out a threat to advance their interests at the
expense of the receiver. 55 Knowing this is a possibility, the receiving state must decide
whether or not to discredit the signals of the sender or to take them seriously.
Some signals are more credible than others because they can convey more
concrete information to the receiving state about the actual capabilities and intentions of
another state, whereas other signals are more ambiguous in nature. Cheap signals are
equivalent to verbal threats and actors face no significant cost to make these types of
claims. Most verbal communication between states, such as diplomatic statements, can be
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thought of as cheap signals that still have the potential to affect a state’s perceptions of
another’s intentions to carry out a threat or not. Costly signals on the other hand are those
threats which would be pricey for a state to break as these signals convey meaning that
the sender is willing to incur some high cost to carry out their threats. Therefore, they are
seen as more credible than cheap signals as they create less uncertainty about a state’s
true intentions which convinces the receiver of the credibility of the sender’s threat. 56
Overall, states send signals as an attempt to convey a message about their intended
actions in the future, but understanding these proclamations does not necessarily require
believing them because honest actors along with deceivers can send the same messages.
This is one of the main reasons why states who are the intended receiver of these signals
pay critical attention to the reputation of the state sending these signals in order to
decipher their credibility. 57 Now that these theories on the causes of interstate was have
been thoroughly explained, they will be applied and related to intrastate conflict to show
how they can also be utilized in the civil war literature as well.
International Relations Theories and Intrastate Conflict
With few exceptions, the civil war onset literature has exclusively examined
factors within a state in order to explain how conflict arises between a government and an
opposition group. This is extremely problematic as states do not simply exist in a vacuum
and they can be influenced by outside forces. Applying the bargaining model and
rationalist explanations for interstate wars to intrastate conflicts will show how external
actors can effect the decision-making processes of a regime and its opposition to reach
mutual negotiations or opt for continued violence based on the types of signals they send
and how they are perceived.
In all states, a certain level of opposition to the government exists at all times but
particular circumstances make it highly unlikely that these groups will try to overthrow
the regime for several reasons. Sometimes people’s current situations are not deemed bad
enough to risk their lives by joining a rebellion, in other cases a government may be so

56

Ibid, 50-51.

Robert Jervis, “Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images,” in Political
Psychology, edited by Kristen Renwick Monroe (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2002), 304.
57

40

repressive that opposition groups have little or no chance of openly congregating without
facing grave consequences or simply because dissidents are able to come to a mutually
agreed upon contract with the state in order to avoid the costs of fighting. Just as in
interstate wars, some level of uncertainty must be present for civil wars to occur as well.
If a government and its opposition were completely aware of the information regarding
each other’s capabilities, resolve and terms of agreement they would be willing to
compromise on, then they would be able to peacefully settle their problems without
resorting to combat. As war is costly for both parties, the regime and its dissidents will
opt for negotiations that may be less than the ideal standards they were envisioning. But
uncertainty regarding states intensions can effect the probability that interstate and
intrastate wars may occur. A key to understanding how external actors can influence the
onset of this kind of domestic conflict is based on the type of signals they send which are
determined by the actions of a regime or its opposition.
Bargaining and rationalist explanations in international relations theories have
provided significant influence for explaining how interstate wars can occur but few have
attempted to extend this same logic to the study of civil war onset. There are several
characteristics of interstate wars that are prevalent in civil wars as well and sometimes
these features may even be more extreme in these circumstances. Both IR theories
proclaim that conflicts arise over a disagreement regarding either the allocation of
resources or policy choices which hold true in intrastate conflicts as well. A government
and its opposition both have incentives to misrepresent information regarding their
abilities to carry out their threats against one another in pursuit of their demands. 58
Information problems leading to the uncertainty of others’ intentions and capabilities are
actually more severe in intrastate conflicts. For starters, data about the size of potential
rebel forces, their financial income and the level of support they have among their fellow
citizens are usually hard for a government to obtain. Also, rebel groups may sometimes
be unaware of their own strength while in other cases they may have a comprehensive
understanding of their overall capabilities but they may have strong incentives to keep
this knowledge a secret from the government because the security forces of the state
Barbara F. Walter, “Bargaining Failures and Civil War,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009):
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would attempt to eradicate their sphere of influence. Ideally, governments would only
like to grant concessions to dissident groups in which they believe have a strong support
base and are well funded, but they have significant trouble determining weak rebel forces
from strong ones unless they engage them in battle first. This is how the uncertainty of
threats from rebel forces can cause a state to opt for continued violence instead of
reaching a negotiated settlement. Another uncertainty issue arises when governments
have an incentive to withhold information about their willingness to engage in battle or
grant concessions because they may want to appear tough in the face of numerous
potential challengers. 59 Some governments may be secretly uncommitted to actually
going to war with an opposition group and may be eager to grant concessions but they
want to remain tough in the eyes of the population. In this case, uncertainty problems
arise just as in interstate wars, regarding the true intentions of rebels’ and governments’
capabilities and their willingness to carry out their threats.
Also, before civil wars break out, large power asymmetries always exist between
potential rebel groups and the government which makes it more likely and harder to
ascertain if the state will renege on its promises. In attempts to avoid conflict, they may
offer to restructure the political process, share power or transfer autonomy but weak rebel
groups have little capabilities to penalize a government should it fail to follow through
with these agreements. While states in the international system still face the same
commitment problems, they have a variety of economic, military and political means to
keep each other from breaking their promises. 60 As long as rebel groups have little ability
to enforce the terms of an agreement, they may rather risk going to war than risk the
potential that a state will not fulfill its commitments. While states in the international
system still face the same commitment problems, they have a variety of economic,
military and political means to keep each other from breaking their promises. 61 As long
as rebel groups have little ability to enforce the terms of an agreement, they may decide
to continue engaging in violent conflict with the state than risk the potential that a
59
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government would renege on its promises. Although dissidents may not wish to engage
in battle they are faced with the difficult task of negotiating with the regime in a
condition where they have few mechanisms to monitor and check the behavior of the
central government.
Signals from External Actors and the Onset of Civil War
One way which can help increase or decrease the levels of uncertainty between a
state and its opposition is through signals from external actors. Just as states in the
international system signal to each other about the future actions they are willing to take
if one state decides to behave in a certain manner, they also do this in cases of intrastate
conflict as well. Several studies have been conducted to uncover the different types of
signals and the impact they have on the actions of others. Although most of the research
has centered around cases of interstate disputes, the findings can also be applied to
instances of domestic strife between a regime and its opposition where the signals from
external actors affect the probability that both sides will either reach a negotiated
settlement or opt for continued violence instead.
According to work conducted by Robert Jervis and James D. Fearon, states which
are the intended target of the signals should only focus on those which are deemed as
“costly”. This is because costly signals decrease the level of uncertainty between states as
the intended actions of the threatening state are readily observable and pricey for them to
follow through on. The assumption is then that these types of signals cannot be readily
faked and would have dire consequences should a state not take them. 62 There are two
types of costly signals that can be sent and each are thought to actively convince others of
their intentions. The first type of costly signals are ones that “sink costs”, meaning that
they are financially expensive for a state to endure and can be readily observed, examples
of this include mobilizing troops or economic sanctions. 63 The second type of costly
signals are ones which are harmful for the state to break because they are sensitive to the
reactions of their domestic audience which would view their inability to carry out these
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actions as a failure in the state’s foreign policy. These can be thought of as promises to
establish new trade ties or military alliances in which the sending state’s reputation is on
the line internationally and domestically. 64 When states experience severe domestic
conflict, external actors are always prone to comment on these situations out of fear they
may transform into a bigger problem. They attempt to signal to all parties involved in the
dispute what are the appropriate actions that should be taken and signal which side they
would be willing to support should more violence erupt. Normally, states offer support to
the government in power, as most rebel forces are not seen as a viable option for the
future of a country. Therefore, states will send costly signals in support of a regime by
promising new trade ties or military alliances which are aimed at forcing an opposition
party to back down. In atypical situations external actors may send hostile signals to a
government in which they threaten to mobilize troops and enforce economic sanctions if
the government does not change its actions towards dissidents. In both cases, costly
signals from external actors should increase the willingness of both parties to come to a
mutually agreed upon settlement to end the violence because the threats being sent
decrease the uncertainty that one side of the conflict will receive foreign support if a civil
war were to break out. Therefore, costly signals affect the likelihood that a state and its
opposition will more than likely reach mutual negotiations with one another, but cheap
signals do not have this ability.
Cheap signals are considered as less credible than costly ones because they are
simple statements of intent that do not involve taking any costly action. A study by
Robert F. Trager claims that although cheap signals make a state’s willingness to carry
out their threats harder to predict they can still affect the perceptions of intentions.
Usually in interstate disputes, cheap signals are sent via diplomatic statements which
attempt to convey information about the threat each poses to one another. 65 Another
comprehensive study, a dissertation by Clayton Lynn Thyne, relates signals from external
actors to the cause of civil war onset, depending on the type of signal sent. Just as costly
signals have two distinct types, so do cheap signals. Cheap signals that are supportive of
64
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a government are public statements from prominent political figures giving their support
and offers for aid may be made as well. In the case of cheap signals that are hostile
towards a government, public statements condemn the actions of a regime and threaten to
use sanctions if they do not change their ways. 66 Thyne tested these hypotheses through a
large-N analysis of all states from 1949 to 1999 to see the effects that external actors had
on the onset of civil war. In addition he also tested these hypotheses through a case study
that examined how the cheap signals the United States sent affected the onset of the
FLSN’s rebellion in Nicaragua in 1978. 67 In both instances, he finds support for the
hypothesis that cheap signals from external actors can cause civil war onset.
But in this thesis, signals from external actors are treated as an intermediate
variable because the statements from prominent foreign powers are based on the actions
of a regime and its opposition which determine whether or not they will be sent in
support or against either side and whether or not they will be costly or cheap. The most
important kind of signals to pay attention to are cheap ones because they introduce
uncertainty into the bargaining process between a government and its opposition. When
cheap signals condemning the repression tactics of a regime are made it causes dissidents
to overestimate their fighting capabilities based on their future expectations that foreign
allies would intervene on their behalf if a civil war did ensue while simultaneously
causing them to increase their demands on the government, thus making it highly
unlikely that mutual negotiations would be reached to end the rising hostilities.
Definition of Terms
Throughout this thesis, the repression tactics that will be under investigation are
those which are carried out by the state. Repression will be defined as coercive measures
government authorities take to hinder domestic opposition and maintain their stronghold
on power. 68 A plethora of studies have treated state repression as a single entity that those
in office use to deter dissidents from generating too much support for fear that their
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political authority may be in jeopardy. They neglect to realize that there are varying
degrees of repression tactics that can be utilized by regimes and some are more successful
at subduing protest movements while others only escalate the level of violence.
Therefore, two elements, target and type, will be taken into account in order to pinpoint
where the specific kind of repression methods used by both regimes vary. The target
aspect denotes whom the aggression is carried out on, meaning whether or not the
repression is selective or indiscriminate in nature. The latter category refers to when the
state neglects to make a distinction between those who were actively protesting and those
who were not, as violent force is equally inflicted on everyone in the surrounding
vicinity. Whereas selective repression, on the other hand, is only directed at people who
were participating in these movements. The type of repression simply means whether or
not the tactics being carried out were in a violent or nonviolent fashion which can be
conceptualized as restrictive laws versus the use of force. Nonviolent strategies are
usually in the form of legislation preventing certain groups from publicly gathering or
legally organizing while violent measures involve the physical harm of dissidents that can
range from firing teargas into highly populated demonstrations, shooting regime
opponents or systematic torture.
The signals from external actors in this thesis will be classified into two
categories, either “costly” or “cheap” statements that are in support of a regime or its
opposition. Costly signals are those which are pricey for the signaling party to incur but
they are deemed as more credible because of this. 69 Costly signals in support of a regime
are announcements to establish new military alliances or trade ties, while those that are
against a regime will be in the form of economic sanctions or the mobilization of troops.
Cheap signals cost relatively little for external actors to make which is why they are
viewed as less reliable than their counterpart as they do not provide concrete information
regarding whether or not the sending party will act if the level of violence in a country
continues to rise. 70 Cheap signals that are pro-government are vague statements of
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support or offers for aid while anti-government signals are public declarations of
condemnation or the withdrawal of foreign aid to a country.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Restatement of the Research Question and Aim of the Research
This thesis aspires to uncover the specific causal mechanisms that are responsible
for the drastically different outcomes of the Arab Spring uprisings that took place in
Bahrain and Syria. At first glance, these two countries may seem to have relatively little
in common with one another, but after taking a more in-depth look at the two, it is
revealed that they have unique, shared country-specific characteristics that distinguish
them from the rest of the countries engulfed by the Arab Spring. In addition to this, both
regimes responded in a nearly identical fashion to the emerging protest movements which
made it seem probable at first that the aftermath of both uprisings would at least follow a
similar path. As this has clearly not been the case, this study intends to examine the
underlying factors that shaped whether or not the protest movements would result in
the onset of civil war or not. By investigating the understudied independent variable of
repression, this thesis aims to show how a variance in the different type and target of
repression led to the absence of civil war in Bahrain while resulting in the onset of it in
Syria. In addition, it aims to show how the specific kind of repression tactics being used
caused a variance in the signals being sent from external actors which also influenced the
direction of the protest movements into or away from civil war onset.
Why Bahrain and Syria?
The Arab Spring uprisings that occurred in Bahrain and Syria during the
beginning months of 2011 were chosen as the cases best suited for the purpose of this
analysis because they explicitly allow for the roles of repression and signals to be isolated
in order to determine if they have the ability to cause the onset of civil war or not.
The Shared Country-Specific Characteristics of Bahrain and Syria
The unique features of Bahrain and Syria distinguish them from the rest of the
countries that were embroiled in Arab Spring uprisings of their own and essentially
caused them to respond in a similar manner to the initially nonviolent protest movements
that arose. An overview of their shared qualities will be presented to emphasize how they
effected their reactions and thus made it seem highly probable that the aftermath of their
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uprisings would result in similar circumstances.
For starters, both countries have highly heterogeneous populations that are split
along ethnic and religious lines. In Bahrain, Sunni Muslims are actually considered to be
the minority, but there are distinct cliques within this category, furthering the already
fragmented archipelago. There are the Sunni Muslim tribes that are aligned with the
ruling al-Khalifa family, the Nejdi non-tribal Arabs from Saudi Arabia and the Hawala,
Arab settlers from neighboring Iran. 71 While the majority of the population is comprised
of the Baharnah, Arab Shiites who view themselves as the autochthonous inhabitants of
the small island nation, in addition to a few Persian immigrants who only account for a
small fraction of the Shiite community. 72 In Syria, Sunni Muslim Arabs constitute the
biggest ethno-religious group followed by the Kurds who are non-Arab Sunnis, as well as
smaller factions of Alawites, Christians and Druze. 73
On top of this, both regimes in power come from a minority group within the
state, which is in stark contrast to all the other Arab Spring countries where the
government and the security apparatuses are representative of the dominant majority
group in the population in terms of ethnic and religious composition. In Bahrain, the
reigning al-Khalifa family are Sunni Muslims who reside over a citizenry where 70% are
Shia Muslims 74 while in Syria, the ruling al-Assad clan are Alawites, an offshoot sect of
Shiism, who are in command of a society made up of around 74% Sunni Muslims and
10% Christians. 75
How these shared features effected their similar responses to the Arab Spring
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protests
In countries where a minority group is presiding over a clearly defined dominant
majority, this effects how those in power decide to handle their daily responsibilities and
strongly influences their decision making processes as they are more often than not
viewed as illegitimate leaders in the eyes of the population. As a result, these types of
regimes and their ruling elite must assemble the state in such a way that it will ensure the
persistence of their authority. To maintain their stronghold on power, they must resort to
micromanaging all aspects of society to repress even the slightest signs of any opposition
groups forming as they could not compete against other forces or civil organizations
promising change in the social, political or economic realms as they belong to groups
which are demographically inferior to the rest of the population. 76 Therefore, the best
way to guarantee their persistence overtime is to stack the army, police and secret service
with members of their overrepresented minority to safeguard themselves against
defectors and warrant regime loyalty. This simultaneously provides the government with
the military might needed to oversee all other political institutions, giving them
unrestrained capabilities to repress their opposition with an iron fist.
By taking a closer look at the intricacies that comprise the Bahraini and Syrian
regimes, it is clear to see that they both employed all of these tactics with the hopes of
continuing their rule despite the presence of a prevailing majority group. In both
countries, the armed forces were ethnically stacked with members from their own distinct
minority groups and critical key positions of authority were distributed among their cosectarians in attempts to further strengthen their allies and ensure allegiance to the
regime. As a final precautionary measure, both countries established their own informal
security forces that were tasked to quietly coexist alongside the the military to weed out
any individuals that were critical of the government and thus deemed to be a potential
defector in the near future. In Bahrain, the military was lined with Sunnis, but the regime
also permitted Muslims from this same sect in foreign countries to join their troops who
were then granted citizenship in return for their services in attempts to generate a more
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equal ration of Sunnis to Shiites. 77 While in Syria, the Alawites held the greatest number
of prominent political positions, controlled the top military units within the army and
almost entirely dominated the Republican Guard, an elite division tasked with protecting
the capital of Damascus from any potential coups as this city was formerly a prime target
of such attempts. 78 Finally, both regimes constructed unofficial, “off the books” types of
security forces that carried out the regimes’ most immoral undertakings and were known
as the shabiha, or ghosts, in Syria and the baltagiya, which is similar to thugs, in
Bahrain. 79
Consequently, once the Arab Spring uprisings within their own borders started
gaining a noteworthy amount of momentum in the early months of 2011, it spurred the
minority group leaders of the Bahraini and Syrian regimes into action which caused them
to both respond to the initially nonviolent protesters with severe repression in order to put
an immediate end to this type of civil disobedience. Their shared strategy of utilizing
preventive repression tactics to contain potential revolutionary forces stems from the fact
that their authority is in constant jeopardy as they only embody a small fraction of the
population as a whole and therefore must instantly eliminate any threat to their rule. This
is why the mass protests that took place in both countries were quickly met by
government forces which brutally attacked peaceful protesters and only continued to
intensify the severity of violent acts being inflicted on regime dissidents.
Both regimes attempted to justify their brutal reactions towards protesters by
suggesting that the uprisings taking place were instigated by external forces that were
plotting the overall demise of each nation. This was somehow supposed to validate their
extreme uses of force as it was for the “greater good” of protecting and ensuring their
country’s survival. In Bahrain, the chosen “enemy” was Iran who was accused of
fostering a Shia conspiracy against the government while in Syria, the al-Assad regime
listed a slew of perpetrators as the real antagonists of the uprisings, including Israel, the
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United States, Saudi Arabia and even the Palestinians. This also allowed both regimes to
pit different religious sects against one another, even though the original protests were
peaceful, cross-sectarian in nature and called for greater social, economic and political
rights such as constitutional reforms, freer elections and an end to their state’s human
rights abuses. By invoking this discourse, both regimes were able to turn this particular
frame into a self-fulfilling prophecy by playing on the fears of their religious minorities
through insinuations that their rights and potential lives could be at stake if the majority
rose to power. In Bahrain, this rhetoric was able to rally the Sunni minority against the
Shiites, even the ones who had legitimate grievances with the state and similarly wanted
political reforms as well, it still caused them to eventually back the regime and further
enflame the sectarian animosities against the Shiite majority. While in Syria, the regime
framed any challenge to their authority as a danger to all religious minorities, not just the
Alawites.
A final but nonetheless important commonality that exists between the two
uprisings surprisingly has nothing to do with the similar responses each regime took
against protesters but rather how the international community reacted to the situations in
both countries which bore a striking resemblance. In the beginning stages of the
uprisings, initial statements or signals from prominent external actors condemning the
actions of the Bahraini and Syrian regimes were almost nonexistent, despite their
grotesque use of force against their own citizens. The responses from high ranking
political figures in the United States will be used for the purpose of providing two
examples of this type of behavior. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, flew
to Bahrain only four weeks after the uprisings started and upon his arrival home he said
to the public, “Obviously, leading reform and being responsive is the way we’d like to
see this move forward”, but he failed to denounce the overt repression methods of the
regime. 80 In Syria, the protests started in mid-March, but it was not until the end of July
that then Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, altered the phrase, “Bashar al-Assad is losing
legitimacy”, to that of, “Bashar al-Assad has lost his legitimacy.” 81 These two examples
80
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represent only a microcosm of the signals that were sent by external actors during the
beginning phases of both uprisings which neglected to acknowledge and comment on the
atrocities being committed against peaceful protesters.
Hypotheses and how the theoretical framework of escalation and signaling theories
are relevant to my research
The first hypothesis postulates that the type and target of repression carried out by
the Bahraini and Syrian regimes throughout the duration of the protests can account for
the different outcomes seen in each country today. The second hypothesis posits that the
specific type and target of repression caused a variation in the signals from external
actors, essentially determining if they were made in support of the regime or its
opposition which influenced both parties’ decision making processes in deciding to come
to mutual agreements or opt for incurring the costs of going to war with one another. The
dependent variable can be conceptualized in terms of the absence of civil war onset
(Bahrain) or the acceleration to the onset of civil war (Syria). This thesis hopes to add to
the civil war onset literature by contributing to a better understanding of how certain
types (nonviolent/violent) and targets (selective/indiscriminate) of state repression
combined with signals from external actors can lead to this type of intrastate conflict.
The type and target of repression carried out by the Bahraini and Syrian regimes
throughout the duration of the protests can account for the different outcomes seen in
each country today. Although both the Bahraini and Syrian security forces responded to
the initially nonviolent protestors with harsh brutality, the main difference lies within the
target of their repression. In Bahrain, the repression methods carried out by the state were
more selective in nature compared to the Syrian response, as most of the violence was
directed specifically at protesters in the city’s main square, Pearl Roundabout. While in
Syria the regime’s first reaction to the uprisings was to rely almost absolutely on
indiscriminate repression, which fails to distinguish between those who were actively
involved in protesting and those who were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time.
In addition to this, more nonviolent types of repression tactics were taken by the Bahraini
regime through the adoption of various laws aimed at hindering the oppositional force’s
ability to legally organize and garner more support from the public. In Syria, the type of
repression methods were mostly violent in nature, as the regime was more focused on
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using tanks and heavy weaponry against mostly unarmed civilians, butchering large
amounts of people as the protests went on.
The type of signals sent by external actors towards each regime and their
opposition eventually changed overtime based on the divergent repression tactics being
carried out by each regime which contributed to the different outcomes seen in each
country today. This study will aim to show how cheap anti-government signals that
involve avowals of condemnation and threats of economic sanctions towards the regime
can influence the likelihood that a state and its opposition will not reach a mutual
negotiation to settle their differences and continue to engage in violent conflict with one
another. In Bahrain, the few signals or statements made by external actors were regularly
in favor of the regime as offers of support were constantly being reiterated while in Syria,
the signals that were made were staunchly against the actions of the government and
support was instead shifted in favor of the oppositional forces as they publicly
condemned the use of harsh repression being carried out by the security forces against
unarmed civilians.
Research Design
In order to address the reason why civil war broke out in Syria but not Bahrain, a
qualitative, comparative case study will be used to test for causation regarding the
independent variable, repression, and the intermediate variable of signals, to see if they
had a deterring or escalatory effect on the protest movements that took place in these
countries during the timeframe from January 2011 until January 2012. Since the research
question of this thesis is in nature, an explanatory inquiry, the central aim of this study is
to systematically examine covariation between the variables of interest among these two
cases for the purpose of causal analysis and to rule out rival explanations to come to a
final conclusion. 82 The comparative case study methodology was chosen as the best
suited strategy for carrying out this task over other approaches such as the experimental
and statistical methods for several reasons. Overall, the best procedure for obtaining
valid, objective scientific explanations is through the experimental method because it can
David Collier, “The Comparative Method,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, ed. Ada
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situationally manipulate the empirical data to be observed. But this approach is rarely
used in the field of political science due to practical constraints and more importantly,
ethical impediments. 83 On the other hand, the statistical method involves the
mathematical maneuvering of observable data conducive to uncovering controlled
relationships among variables. Although it can only control for key variables suspected to
exert influence and not for all the others, it attempts to handle this situation by means of
partial correlations instead. This approach is most favorable for scholars conducting
large-N studies, but for academics analyzing only a few number of cases the comparative
methodology is more feasible to use as the small quantity of relative situations do not
allow for this kind of systematic control by way of partial correlations. 84 After taking all
these factors into consideration, this is why the comparative case study method was
adopted for the purpose of this study to allow for a more comprehensive analysis on how
the roles of repression and signals from external actors can effect the likelihood of civil
war onset.
As Bahrain and Syria are the only subjects of interest in this project, it was more
beneficial to use a qualitative research design over a quantitative one as the small number
of cases allows for the opportunity to provide a complete, in-depth account of the specific
phenomenon under study which strengthens the internal and measurement validity of
causal inferences made. Although, a commonly cited weakness of qualitative,
comparative case studies is that they lack external validity, meaning that the results
obtained cannot be generalized for different situations or ones involving larger
populations. This is why a thick description of the cases will be presented as a means to
solving this applicability problem. It is important to briefly reinforce the justification for
small-N studies and therefore, worth mentioning a few issues illuminating these problems
of validity. Researchers carrying out large-N studies can fall victim to “conceptual
stretching”, where an idea so general is applied to a wide range of situations and when
newer cases are added, the specific meaning of the concept at hand may not directly
apply to them. Also, by doing this it fails to highlight the differences and similarities that
Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” The American Political Science
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exist between cases which is the fundamental ingredient for meaningful comparative
analysis. 85
A bigger constraint that this methodology must address is what several refer to as
the “many variables small N” problem, but if properly utilized it can still compete with
alternative explanations. In order to do this, the most similar systems design will be used
to match Bahrain and Syria on all the important country-specific characteristics that they
share which are not relevant to this study, in effect controlling for them and thus reducing
the many variables issue. Although, it is nearly impossible to systematically match cases
on all relevant control variables, a looser application of the most similar systems was
applied. As the number of variables cannot be reduced by using comparable cases in
which many variables are constant, except with regard to the phenomenon under
investigation, it permits for the formation of relationships among a few key variables
while keeping constant as many extraneous variables as possible. 86 As this thesis is
interested in establishing whether or not there is causal relation between the independent
variable, repression, as well as the intermediate variable, signals from external actors, and
the dependent variables which can be conceptualized as the presence of civil war onset or
the absence of it, the most similar systems design is the most suitable technique for
achieving this goal.
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CHAPTER 4: BAHRAIN
On February 14, 2001, Bahrainis went out to cast their vote on the newlyproposed principles outlined in the National Action Charter, put forth by King Hamad bin
Isa al-Khalifa, in his attempts to end the ongoing unrest of the 1990s, return the country
to constitutional rule and liberalize the state. Therefore, it was no surprise that the
national referendum ratified the charter with an overwhelmingly high level of approval,
as 90% of the population participated in the election and out of this, 98.4% voted in favor
of it. 87 At first, the reforms seemed promising as they established an 80-member
bicameral parliament, the National Assembly, that consisted of a 40-member,
government-appointed upper house, the Shura Council, and a 40-member, popularlyelected lower house, the Council of Representatives, in addition to granting universal
suffrage to women which made Bahrain the first Gulf Cooperation Council member-state
to do so. 88 But little did the ruling al-Khalifa family know that a decade later, on the 10th
anniversary of the National Action Charter, that protests would rock this tiny island
nation to its core.
Background History
The date that most in the Western world associate with love and compassion,
February 14, 2011 had a completely different meaning in Bahrain as citizens declared it
to be a “Day of Rage” which signified to the world that the Arab Spring uprisings had
finally reached the shores of the Persian Gulf. The initial demands of the protesters were
numerous but they generally centered around finally implementing the long-overdue
reforms promised to them in the National Action Charter that never materialized, as many
felt that the constitutional amendments failed to adequately address people’s main
complaint of not having equitable political representation. 89 Although members of the
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Council of Representatives were elected based on popular vote, the trivial abilities
granted to them rendered this lower house of parliament a largely ineffective government
body that was seemingly created for more symbolic purposes to appease societal
demands at the time. This is why critics on the regime to grant the Council more genuine
powers, to stop ethnically gerrymandering electoral districts and to provide better job
opportunities for all Bahrainis. During the first stage of the protest movements, relatively
few people demanded that the royal family step down as they preferred meaningful
reform over revolution.
But fast-forward a couple months ahead to April and only remnants of the oncepromising demonstrations could be seen as they had been almost entirely obliterated by
the regime. The Bahraini uprising resulted in one of the only clear-cut victories for
repression throughout the course of the Arab Spring. 90 What was it about the kind of
repression tactics that the Bahraini security forces used which enabled them to quell
rising tensions and deter citizens away from continuing to actively protest? Various
scholars have attributed the intervention of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s Jazeera
Shield Forces to their overall success. The GCC, acting in accordance with one of their
core principles, indivisible security, determined that it was their collective responsibility
to uphold, protect and ensure the safety of the Bahraini regime which prompted them to
take action. 91 Many have been too quick in accrediting Bahrain’s triumphant victory over
the demonstrations to the intervention by the GCC-JSF because it is the easiest, most
straightforward explanation.
In general, most people are not familiar with this tiny archipelago comprised of 33
islands, equaling 290 square miles combined, or for comparison purposes less than the
size of New York City as a whole, in addition to housing a population of only 1.3 million
in which 50% of the inhabitants are immigrants. 92 Bahrain may be the smallest Middle
Eastern country, but its size belies its critical importance to the American government, as
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the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet is stationed there, making this country a very vital ally. This
is also why most Western critics remained silent in commenting on the events taking
place in Bahrain and were negligent in denouncing the regime’s violent use of force
against peaceful protesters. On top of all that, Bahrain normally receives relatively little
news coverage so it came as no shock that once the demonstrations began only a select
number of Arab television stations decided to closely monitor the situation and
international media outlets paid even less attention to the uprising.
All of these factors put together have resulted in the common trend of claiming
that the external support Bahrain received prevented the country from descending into
civil war onset, however, those asserting this statement as truth have not bothered to take
a closer look into the finer details of the uprising. Although the constant reiteration that
the al-Khalifa regime was only able to conquer the uprising due to the GCC forces gives
this claim some verisimilitude, in reality, it represents a gross miscalculation of
accountability as it was the Bahraini regimes own security forces who violently repressed
their own people which resulted in the termination of the protest movements. The GCC
intervention was not responsible for rescuing Bahrain from internal breakdown, at best,
the crackdown on protesters might have taken a bit longer to accomplish without GCC
assistance, but nevertheless the regime still would have triumphed. 93
The Bahraini uprising that took place during February and March of 2011
deserved more attention than it received, especially since it showed the international
community that the oil-rich monarchies of the Gulf were not immune to popular revolt
and also due to the fact that it was the largest of the Arab Spring uprisings, in terms of the
percentage of the total population that actively took to the streets in protest. 94 But most
importantly because the outcome of the uprising represented one of the only instances in
which state repression succeeded in ending the unrest as many other autocratic rulers
throughout the MENA region during this time attempted similar tactics, most did not end
up working in their favor. Consequently, the case of Bahrain provides for an interesting
research opportunity to uncover the specific kind of repression methods that were utilized
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by the government’s security forces which prevented the onset of civil war from
occurring. In order to conduct an in-depth examination into the explicit dynamics of the
uprising, data was collected from five sources, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International, the U.S. State Department, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry
and the Political Terror Scale, that were specifically related to the repression tactics of the
regime. The material was coded accordingly and sorted into four, overarching categories
of repression which are as follows: violent, nonviolent, indiscriminate and selective.
Tallying up the total number of times each kind of repression method was carried out
helped in determining the theme of the three phases of the uprising. A chronological
presentation of the events that took place will be given along with a systematic
application of thematic analysis that will unmask the distinct kind of state repression
tactics that had a deterring or escalatory effect on the momentum of the protest
movements. This will allow me to see if the first hypothesis of this thesis is supported or
not, which predicts that indiscriminate and violent repression will accelerate protest
movements while selective and violent repression will end in a victory for the
government. A thick description of the interactions between the state security forces and
the demonstrators will be given to emphasize how it ultimately led to the regime’s
success.
Timeline of the Uprising – Phase One (February 14 – February 18)
The first stage of the uprising was relatively short, lasting for only five days, but
nonetheless, a consistent patterned response regarding the repression tactics of the state’s
security forces and signals from external actors can still be clearly observed. Like many
other authoritarian leaders during this time that were attempting to overcome the protest
movements erupting within their own territories, the ruling al-Khalifa family followed
suit and chose to use violent force against nonviolent demonstrators with the hopes of
deterring them from continuing to rise up against the regime. But unlike many
authoritarian leaders during this time, the international community’s vague response to
the uprising taking place in Bahrain showed their strong determination to sustain the
current regime as cheap signals were consistently sent to emphasize their unwavering
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support to the al-Khalifa family, whereas many other dictators in the MENA region were
immediately condemned for their barbaric reaction towards peaceful protesters.
On February 14th, protesters peacefully gathered at one of the most popular
plazas, Pearl Roundabout, in the capital city, Manama, essentially taking a page out of the
tactics Egyptian protesters used when they decided to hold their mass demonstrations in
Cairo’s Tahrir Square. This site was a symbolic one because not only did the statute that
lies in the center of this main traffic circle represent the country’s pearl-diving past, it
was also situated in the heart of Bahrain, making it an ideal location to host the first
large-scale protests. 95 The riot police responded to the situation in an unnecessary and
shockingly inhuman manner as large quantities of teargas were hurled into the colossal
crowd of protesters along with an abundance of rubber bullets that were shot at them as
well. Eventually they opened fire with live ammunition as a final attempt to disperse the
massive amounts of people that were continuing to occupy the area. By the end of the
day, a single fatality was recorded, as one protester was killed by the riot police. 96 The
repression methods utilized by the state security forces in this instance are classified as
violent and selective as those who were actively engaged in protesting were targeted with
severe aggression.
On February 15th, a funeral procession was held in honor of the protester who was
killed the day prior in which thousands of Bahrainis showed up to pay their respects.
Those in attendance were a mixture of people, as some were involved in the
demonstrations from the 14th while others had not been associated with them whatsoever.
But when the riot police showed up to the scene, they concluded that the majority of
those present had partaken in the events of the previous day and acting on this “logic”
they haphazardly opened fire on everyone in mourning with live ammunition, rubber
bullets and teargas. 97 In this case, the tactics of the riot police are categorized as violent
and indiscriminate because they targeted people while they were grieving the loss of a
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fellow Bahraini and were visibly not engaged in any form of protest during the time of
attack.
Additionally, on this day as well, half way across the world the U.S. Department
of State was gearing up to issue one of their first press releases regarding the unraveling
situation in the small Gulf archipelago. In the report, it expressed America’s growing
concern with the path the uprising was starting to take but whole-heartedly welcomed the
al-Khalifa regime’s ‘pledge’ to uncover and hold accountable those who were responsible
for the deaths of the unarmed demonstrators. 98 This statement is classified as a cheap
signal that was pro-government as it merely articulated the United State’s stance towards
one of their most vital allies in the region which is that it would not publically denounce
their actions but rather highlight how the U.S. supports their next moves to settle the
rising tensions.
Two days later at 3AM on the 17th, security forces conducted a surprise attack on
protesters who were camped out at Pearl Roundabout. According to an eyewitness at the
scene, they launched “tons of teargas” into several tents without caring to check if those
inside were sound asleep or not. 99 As a result of their disdain for basic humanity, there
were several reports of young children injured on this day. These kind of repression
tactics are characterized as violent and indiscriminate because although protesters were
targeted, the majority of them were sleeping when they were viciously assaulted. To
compound the atrocities that were being committed, the riot police also prevented
ambulances dispatched to Pearl Roundabout from reaching the wounded and one incident
was reported in which four paramedics were beaten by the security forces for attempting
to break the blockade. 100 Prohibiting hospital vehicles from entering the main parameters
to rescue those in dire need of assistance qualifies as a nonviolent and indiscriminate
repression tactic as medical personnel were stopped from performing their duties of
treating the wounded. But assaulting these same medical personnel while they were
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trying to pick up the injured is a kind of indiscriminate and violent repression technique
as they were attacked for merely doing their job. Throughout the remainder of the day,
the government enforced travel bans on some of the country’s most vocal political
activists, thus preventing them from fleeing Bahrain to avoid being arbitrarily detained by
the security forces who were tasked with ensuring their silence during this tumultuous
period of unrest. 101 This is grouped as a type of selective and nonviolent repression
method because it violates a specific group of people’s right to freedom of movement as
those who were targeted were well-known critics of the regime.
As February 18th rolled around, thousands more Bahrainis had uniformly taken to
the streets to voice their strong condemnation of the regime’s ongoing use of violent
force against unarmed demonstrators and they demanded justice for those who had been
injured and killed by the security forces in addition to still continuing to call on the
government to meet their political, social and economic demands. 102 The protests at Pearl
Roundabout resumed and as predicted, the security forces once again responded with the
same violent and selective repression tactics that they had used in the days’ prior as bouts
of teargas, rubber bullets and live ammunition were dispersed throughout the crowds.
They also applied these same measures against protesters who were praying near Pearl
Roundabout, but since the people targeted were not involved in demonstrating at the time
of attack, this instance is classified as a case of indiscriminate and violent repression. 103
Lastly, they maintained their blockade against ambulances trying access to Pearl
Roundabout, showing once again their continued use of nonviolent and indiscriminate
tactics.
This day saw the first condemnation, not of the Bahraini regime per se, but rather
of their security forces’ choice of weaponry, as Ms. Pillay, the United Nation’s former
High Commissioner for Human Rights, heavily censured the use of military-grade
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shotguns against peaceful protesters. 104 There was a clear-cut attempt not to criticize the
actual government of Bahrain but merely slap them on the wrist by announcing that the
international community disapproved of this type of aggression towards its citizens who
were actively involved in protesting. This statement is classified as a cheap signal as it
simply articulated that this type of force was not tolerable to various member states
within the UN. Also, airing on February 18th was former Secretary of State, Hillary
Clinton’s interview with ABC’s This Week host, Christiane Amanpour. In an attempt to
get a straight answer out of Secretary Clinton, Mrs. Amanpour tried to pin her in a corner
when she asked the taboo question, “Will the United States condemn or hold Bahrain to
the same standard as we saw them hold Egypt?” To which Secretary Clinton responded,
“These are individual national events that respond to some of the same but often different
impulses. And so we’ve repeatedly said we want to see reform go forward, we want to
see it done peacefully, we want to see it inclusive, we want to see countries move toward
democracy. And we will keep saying that. 105 Essentially, perfecting the art of ‘beatingaround-the-bush’, she avoided publically criticizing their strategic ally in the Gulf. This
signal is categorized as cheap and pro-government as it does not denounce the regime but
rather shows the United State’s continued hopefulness in the Bahraini regime to achieve
meaningful dialogue with its opposition to implement real change in the country.
The Theme of Phase One of the Uprising
During this beginning stage, the most prevalent kind of repression that was
utilized by the state’s security forces was indiscriminate and violent, alluding to the first
theme of the uprising which is that the use of these types of repression tactics against
civilians and unarmed demonstrators only succeeded in escalating the momentum of the
protest movements. Although the riot police also carried out more selective measures as
well to quell the emerging unrest, their excessive use of force against innocent
bystanders, grieving civilians, medical personnel and resting protesters alongside their
sleeping children caused mass outrage among the majority of Bahrainis which prompted
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them to take to the streets. Unlike selective repression techniques in which only active
protest participants and their main collaborators are targeted, indiscriminate repression is
carried out at a higher level of aggregation that cannot, or does not care to adequately
differentiate between those involved in demonstrations and those who are not. 106 The
most frequent type of this kind of tactic throughout this period was indiscriminate
repression that was directed at people simply by their location. The government ordered
the security forces to use unnecessary force but when they dispersed teargas, rubber
bullets and live ammunition upon people mourning during a funeral procession, against
harmless citizens praying near Pearl Roundabout, on protesters deep in slumber and at
doctors attempting to rescue the wounded it engendered mass amounts people which
caused them to become anti-regime activists. In addition, these same violent tactics were
perpetrated against peaceful protesters that only further added to the utter outrage of
Bahrainis as citizens were merely exercising their right to freedom of assembly which did
not warrant this kind of ferocious state response. Also, in almost all instances, the police
and security forces resorted to the disproportionate use of teargas and rubber bullets to
disband large crowds of demonstrators in a manner that did not take into account whether
or not they would cause minimal or fatal injuries to the protesters. Lastly, opening fire on
unarmed dissidents and defenseless bystanders when the military troops themselves were
not subjected to any immediate threat of serious injury or death emphasizes the fact that
they clearly should have used significantly less lethal means when confronting civilians.
The escalation theory of civil war onset predicts that when a regime’s security
forces respond to initially nonviolent movements with such brutal measures it causes
citizens to view regular channels for initiating political change as off-limits to them while
concurrently adding to the grievances that they already have. 107 Additionally, this theory
states that protesters, in a last attempt to get the state to implement their desired changes,
will mobilize a significant amount of the population to join them in their demonstrations.
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This is precisely what occurred in the first stage of the Bahraini uprising as the protests
which ensued on the 18th had the highest number of active participants recorded to date.
The reason why thousands of citizens decided to join the rallies was to voice their strong
condemnation against the regime’s ongoing use of violent and indiscriminate repression
methods that were being used against unarmed demonstrators and harmless civilians in
which they wanted justice for, in addition to remaining steadfast in calling on the
government to meet their political, social and economic demands. Although it was
surprising that the demonstrators had yet to resort to violent tactics that mirrored the
regime’s despite the state’s increase in the use of violent and indiscriminate repression
techniques. What can account for this seemingly startling scenario is the use of cheap
and pro-government signals from the international community, in spite of the escalating
brutality, which sent a message to the regime’s oppositional forces that they would be
willing to step in on behalf of the al-Khalifa family if the situation started to steer towards
a path not to their liking. As on February 15th and 18th, statements were made from
various UN and U.S. representatives that briefly acknowledged the rising tensions in the
country but refused to overtly condemn the regime for violently suppressing unarmed
demonstrators and only continued to announce their shared feeling of hopefulness that a
national dialogue would take place to help end the ongoing unrest. This essentially
signaled to the regime that they could continue responding to the protest movements with
their usual tactics as the international community was not going to publically denounce
their activities, giving them a type of ‘free-pass’ to put down the uprising by any means.
But the next moves of the ruling al-Khalifa family were very critical as they had
the potential to escalate the momentum of the protests closer to the onset of civil war. It
was during this period that the uprising most closely resembled that of Syria’s. Had the
regime continued to increase their tactics of utilizing indiscriminate and violent
repression with the hopes of halting the protest movements from gaining more strength it
would have likely pushed activists towards more rebellious strategies to achieve their
desired goals. 108
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Timeline of the Uprisings – Phase Two (February 19 – March 15)
The second stage of the uprising is characterized by the regime’s attempted efforts
at offering mild concessions which were expected to bring about political quiescence. By
utilizing a different, nonviolent approach, the government hoped that this would put an
end to the ongoing unrest. In addition, during this period the number of signals that were
sent in favor of the regime almost doubled as many praised King Hamad for taking the
initiative in trying to mitigate the country’s internal strife by means of a national dialogue
between the government and its main opposition to help steer Bahrain back towards
regime stability.
This explains why on February 19th, under the strong influence of Crown Prince
Salman, King Hamad ordered all military personnel to withdraw their troops from Pearl
Roundabout. For around two whole weeks, the security forces were nowhere to be seen
as they were instructed to allow the demonstrators to peacefully organize. 109 Therefore,
since it seemingly appeared that the government had finally decided to end its campaign
of brutally suppressing all forms of dissent, citizens also did not feel compelled to revert
to more violent styles of protest and thus they continued their use of pacific methods
instead. Also on this day, the U.S. Department of State was overtly positive in their
commendation towards the Bahraini regime’s new strategy of addressing its citizen’s
grievances. Former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was ecstatic when she phoned
Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal and articulated America’s optimism that
Bahrain’s regional allies would also approve their new strategy of offering concessions
that were in line with its peoples’ demands as a constructive path towards rebuilding the
country back to its former stable self. 110 This is classified as a cheap and supportive
signal because it was made in favor of the al-Khalifa government and also encouraged
surrounding countries to back the regime’s newfound efforts as well.
However, contrary to the regime’s belief that proposing minor concessions would
decrease these kinds of activities, the number of people that attended the demonstrations
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at Pearl Roundabout on the 22nd reached a skyrocketing 150,000 participants. 111 The
main reason behind the growing momentum of the protest movements was the riot
police’s barbaric use of force against defenseless demonstrators during the initial phase of
the uprising. But despite this, on the same day, UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon
greeted King Hamad’s decision to engage in discussions with the country’s anti-regime
demonstrators with open arms and announced that if requested, the United Nations would
be ready to help implement this process. 112 This statement qualifies as a cheap and
supportive signal that borders on the verge of being a costly one as it alludes to the fact
that the UN would be willing to aid Bahrain in reaching negotiations with its opposition.
On the next day, February 23rd, due to the escalation, King Hamad enacted further
measures to appease civilians demands as he released 23 political activists from prison
who had been detained since August 2010. 113 In addition to this, he also announced that
February 25th would be a national day of mourning for those that were killed during the
uprising. 114
However, on the morning of February 25th, the anticipated state-wide day of
grievance was met with substantial anti-government demonstrations as almost 40% of the
Bahraini population reportedly showed up to signify that they still wanted the officers
responsible for injuring and killing the peaceful protesters to be held accountable for their
actions, tried in a court of law and brought to justice and simply declaring a national day
of mourning was not going to appease them. 115 But the unwillingness of the regime to
acknowledge these demands did not help their case as their continued inaction only
further infuriated civilians. Despite this, King Hamad was still adamant that acceding to
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some of the protesters’ demands would quell the uprising’s momentum which is why on
the 26th he altered several cabinet positions that entailed removing two al-Khalifa family
members from their posts to slightly reduce the royal clan’s dominance. 116 The new
associates filled the cabinet seats which had the power to improve people’s living
conditions and create more job opportunities but this calculated move did not have a
deterrent effect on the demonstrators who continued to turn out in large numbers.
Although these mild reforms did not stop the plethora of proclamations coming in
from the international community as they continued to voice their staunch support for the
Bahraini regime and for the next week only costly and cheap signals were sent in favor of
the ruling al-Khalifa family. On March 2nd, the Gulf Cooperation Council unleashed their
master plan to assist Oman and Bahrain in ending the domestic conflict going on in both
their countries through massive aid packages that would provide better economic
opportunities for all their citizens and was hoped to halt the large demonstrations from
continuing to take place. An undisclosed source speaking on behalf of the Gulf
Cooperation Council told Gulf News that, “The political regime in Bahrain has full
support from the GCC countries.” 117 By offering such large monetary installments to the
Bahraini government sent a costly signal to their opposition that the GCC was going to
maintain their patronage to their loyal member state no matter the price. On the following
day, the U.S. Department of State sent out yet another press release describing how
Bahrain has been a long-standing ally to America which is why they would remain
committed to ensuring that the national dialogue with its citizens would result in some
type of negotiated settlements. 118 A few days later on March 10th, UN Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon again reiterated the United Nation’s readiness to provide material support
to the nationally-led endeavors if they were invited to do so by the Bahraini regime and
called on the country’s neighbors and the larger international community to also show
their support for the dialogue process which was conducive for credible agreements to be
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implemented in Bahrain. 119 On this same day, the United Arab Emirates Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahayan, speaking on behalf of the GCC,
emphasized their support for the continued peace talks and stated that the Council would,
“Expect all Bahrainis will be willing to support this approach.” 120 Both of these
announcements from representatives of the UN and the GCC are grouped together and
coded as cheap, pro-government signals as they were both sent to highlight these
organizations backing of the Bahraini regime through their ongoing statements of support
for their attempts at using nonviolent means to end hostilities.
But as the days progressed, it was clear to see that the national dialogue between
the government and the main opposition group, al-Wifaq, had failed to achieve any
meaningful negotiations. Up until this period, the protests had normally remained
stationary at Pearl Roundabout, but on March 12th the demonstrators organized antiregime marches that headed towards the Royal Court in al-Riffa as well as the University
of Bahrain, in attempts to spur the state into finally acting in their favor by implementing
their multiplying demands. 121 But both demonstrations ended violently as anti-regime
protesters encountered regime supporters who were allegedly armed with sticks and
knives and thus both sides began to attack one another. Further reports from this day also
described how the anti-government demonstrators assaulted some students at the
University of Bahrain and committed acts of vandalism as well. 122 Although these two
incidents do not fit under any repression category as the tactics were not carried out by
the state but rather by two different protest groups against one another, it is still important
to mention because it signifies how the uprising was starting to become more violent.
The next day, the demonstrators resumed their former peaceful activities, though
they were becoming noticeably more disruptive, especially for citizens trying to carryout
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Address Reforms, Engage in Peaceful, Broad-based Reconciliation Process (SG/SM/13434, March 10,
2011).
119

120

“Sectarian Clashes at Bahrain School,” Al Jazeera, March 10, 2011.

121
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry
(Presented in Manama, Bahrain, November 23, 2011), 122.
122

Ibid, 123.

70

their everyday errands as protesters began to block off the main roads in Manama,
preventing anyone from passing through. In addition to this, they also started to occupy
Bahrain’s Financial Harbor district, causing extreme distress for the ruling al-Khalifa
family as they feared that important infrastructure would be damaged in retaliation. This
prompted the regime to awaken the riot police from their slumber and send them in to
mitigate the situation using their former tactics as teargas, rubber bullets and live
ammunition were dispersed throughout the crowds of people blocking the main roads and
against those at Pearl Roundabout. 123 In both of these situations, the repression methods
of the riot police are categorized as selective and violent as the people who were targeted
were actively involved in protesting or were hindering others from passing through the
central streets. Later on that night, King Hamad decided to seek guidance from his GCC
neighbors on how to handle the unraveling state of affairs.
On March 15th, the King declared a 3-month ‘State of National Safety’ which
essentially equipped the government with a wide range of capabilities to do as they
pleased in order to protect the welfare of Bahrainis. 124 This Royal Decree qualifies as a
kind of nonviolent and indiscriminate repression tactic as it effected everyone in the
country by restricting several of their basic civil liberties that were outlined under the
various articles describing the powers of the government during this three-month period.
In addition to this, the King also announced that he requested assistance from the GCC’s
Joint Security Forces which were expected to arrive on the following day. This caused
tensions to reach an all-time high as the majority of citizens were enraged at the fact that
outside forces were granted the ability to meddle in the domestic affairs of Bahrain. 125
As a result, numerous spouts of violence ensued throughout the day in several
Shia villages that were put down by the riot police who responded to them in an identical
fashion with teargas, rubber bullets and live ammunition, making these more cases in
which violent and selective repression tactics were used. Reports also surfaced in which
witnesses described how the security forces were aimlessly firing teargas and rubber
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bullets into a local medical center in Sitra as well as how they were launching teargas
canisters into the Bahrain International Hospital without entering. 126 Lastly, they also
attacked several ambulances leaving Salmaniya hospital that were on their way to reach
injured demonstrators at Pearl Roundabout. 127 Each of these cases were grouped together
and coded as incidents in which the regime’s security forces carried out indiscriminate
and violent repression techniques as targeting hospital buildings is simply atrocious as is
physically assaulting medical vehicles.
After the events of the day had concluded, the European Union High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, issued a
formal statement that proclaimed the EU’s growing concern about the seriousness of the
level of force being inflicted upon unarmed protesters on the central streets of Manama,
the country’s capital city and their fears that the increasing sectarian rhetoric would only
lead to more violence not only between the demonstrators themselves but also against the
Bahraini security forces as well. But despite the government’s resumed use of violent
repression tactics she still refrained from explicitly calling out the regime and continued
to reiterate the recycled response, “I call on all the security forces present to respect
human rights and fundamental freedoms. I urge all sides to take the necessary steps to
create the conditions to allow serious, comprehensive and constructive dialogue to
proceed without delay.” 128 This statement qualifies as a cheap supportive signal towards
the ruling al-Khalifa family and the protesters as the announcement conveyed to both
parties the EU’s hopefulness towards a nonviolent strategy to end the resumed
aggression.
Theme of Phase Two of the Uprising
Throughout this second phase, the use of state repression was hardly seen as King
Hamad tried to show the protesters a sign of goodwill by ordering the state security
forces to retreat from Pearl Roundabout. He hoped that offering mild concessions would
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cause citizens to cease their current activities in exchange for resolving their issues with
the regime through more discursive practices instead, but after citizens had witnessed the
brutality inflicted on unarmed protesters and innocent civilians, their demands had
multiplied and became more extreme than before. This brings attention to the next theme
of the uprising which is that the attempted concessions failed to appease protesters evergrowing demands causing their behavior to become more disruptive in nature that
resulted in the regime’s return to violent, but more selective repression techniques to halt
the rapidly increasing momentum of the protests. But the regime’s refusal to compromise
with the opposition was also compounded by the fact that they had received an
abundance of cheap, pro-government signals from multiple international, regional and
domestic organizations that hindered their willingness to reach negotiations that were
acceptable to all parties. Since it was in both the West and the GCC’s best strategic
interests for the Bahraini regime to remain in power, they hoped their signals would
influence the outcome of the settlements or at the very best influence the expectations of
the regime’s main conflict protagonists from backing down on their demands to shape the
outcome of the uprising to their liking. 129
The dialogue that ensued between Crown Prince Salman and the largest
opposition group, al-Wifaq, was thought to be the end-all solution that would finally
bring the ongoing unrest to a close as this organization was believed to have the capacity
to effectively articulate the specific desires of the demonstrators to the ruling family that
would result in the establishment of mutually agreed upon negotiations. This ideal
situation would have been more probable before the security forces violently suppressed
peaceful demonstrators and civilians during the initial phase of the uprising as citizen’s
demands were not so unfathomable for the regime at this point. The most common calls
were for the establishment of a fully-elected parliament, an end to the gerrymandering of
electoral districts to favor Sunnis over Shiites, better job opportunities for all Bahrainis
and the removal of the hardline Prime Minister and member of the royal family, Sheikh
Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, the world’s longest-serving premier, who has held this
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position since 1971. 130
However, the uprising, which was originally incited by regional developments
transformed overtime due to the sheer outrage many Bahrainis felt towards the regime
after seeing the barbaric response from the security forces against the pacific movement
that was starting to emerge. Since indiscriminate and violent repression tactics were
carried out against the citizenry it mobilized former inactive civilians to join in the
dissident activities because of the rage that this type of violence provokes which gives
people the motivation needed to join the cause and not fear the consequences of doing
so. 131 The original demands of the protesters started to escalate from mild constitutional
reforms to more radical ultimatums such as the highly vocalized call for a republic. 132
These few, hesitant attempts towards formal agreements were short-lived as al-Wifaq
refused to compromise on one of their main issues which was to establish a real
constitutional monarchy, not simply the façade of one, where the Prime Minister and the
rest of the cabinet members would be chosen by a fully elected parliament. Since the
protesters wanted more from the regime than originally stated, the government became
increasingly more unwilling to reach a compromise than before which resulted in the
overall failure of the concessions as they no longer would please such a highly
dissatisfied population.
While all of this was occurring, the uprising was continuing to gain a significant
amount of supporters daily. The regime’s initial use of violent and indiscriminate
repression was essentially responsible for brining about this second, larger wave of
protesters to the streets, as an increasing percentage of the opposition started to believe
that the government was neither legitimate nor capable of enacting any meaningful
reforms. 133 Feeling considerably threatened, the government lashed out by completely
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ending discussions on the future possibility of reform and during the final days of this
second stage, they ordered the security forces to resort back to their initial repression
techniques. This meant that the ongoing demonstrations at Pearl Roundabout, the
Financial Harbor district, throughout the main streets of Manama and in several Shia
villages were once again met with loads of teargas, rubber bullets and an overabundance
of live ammunition. Thus far, the path of the Bahraini uprising has continued to support
the escalation theory of civil war onset as it emphasizes how the use of violent and
indiscriminate repression against unarmed demonstrators and innocent civilians
mobilized more than half of the population onto the streets to demand action and justice
for those injured and killed by the regime’s security forces, although the dissidents at this
point had yet to turn to more violent means to reach their goals.
The overall theme of the second phase of the Bahraini uprising highlights the fact
that the failed concessions led to a return to the use of violent but more selective
repression tactics. But the failure to reach any mutually acceptable concessions stemmed
from the regime’s initial use of violent and indiscriminate repression tactics against
peaceful protesters which escalated demonstrator’s demands to such an extent that the
government was no longer willing to compromise, but in addition to this, what also
influenced the al-Khalifa regime from refusing to negotiate was due to the cheap and
costly supportive signals it received from the international community. For starters, after
the GCC decided to give the country enormous concessions in the form of monetary
payments that were anticipated to appease the majority of citizen’s grievances it sent a
message to the opposition that the Bahraini government would have outside backing no
matter what direction the protest movements took. Such costly signals require a very high
level of commitment and generally work to deter regime dissidents from continuing to
engage in their current tactics as the signaling parties show the opposition that they do
not stand a chance if they continue to carry on with their calls to topple the regime. 134
Also, the United Nations, European Union and U.S. Department of State
repeatedly restated their commitment towards helping the Bahraini regime if necessary to
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carry out a friendly national dialogue with its main dissidents so that the ongoing unrest
would finally be put to bed. This sent a clear message to the protesters but their lingering
disgust with the security forces initial use of indiscriminate and violent repression against
unarmed demonstrators and innocent civilians hindered their willingness to accede on
any of their demands against the regime. But the government on the other hand, did not
feel compelled to compromise on any of the oppositions terms to end the ongoing unrest
because they felt that they had strong support from the international community due to
the cheap, pro-government signals they continuously made. Eventually, the dissidents
started to realize in the third phase of the uprising that they would have to accept defeat
as the signals being sent were not in their favor and the regime would likely triumph over
them, especially combined with their new repression tactics that were more selective in
nature. 135
Timeline of the Uprisings – Phase Three (March 16 – April 1)
On March 16th, around 1,500 members from the GCC’s Joint Security Forces
arrived in Bahrain during the early morning. They were instructed to safeguard important
government installations in the Financial Harbor district and were ordered to refrain from
actively engaging with the protesters as this task was solely reserved for the Bahraini
security forces. 136 The riot police cleared Pearl Roundabout by dispersing copious
amounts of teargas and rubber bullets while proceeding to open fire with live ammunition
against any remaining demonstrators, making this another instance in which violent and
selective repression tactics were used. 137 The security forces also resumed more of their
old tactics as they started to divert cars away from Salmaniya hospital and prevented
ambulances there from entering or exiting to assist the multitude of wounded people
scattered throughout the capital city. They also hijacked the patient ward at Salmaniya to
further assault people with protest-related injuries and removed those requiring urgent
medical treatment to restricted areas within the hospital that were being utilized as
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improvised torture sites. 138 The first two cases are grouped together as indiscriminate and
nonviolent repression methods as ambulances and civilians were prevented from either
seeking or providing medical assistance. The second two cases are classified as instances
of indiscriminate and violent repression as the security forces were assaulting the
wounded and subjecting them to prolonged periods of suffering. Lastly, throughout the
remainder of the day the state began its harshest crackdown yet against prominent
political opponents and all suspected pro-democracy supporters by conducting nighttime
raids on all households and detaining those who fit this criteria. 139 These types of
activities are branded as selective and nonviolent repression techniques as those who
were imprisoned were some of the most well-known regime critics.
During the early hours of March 17th, the police continued to conduct their raids
on several residences, looking for political community leaders and activists and taking
them into custody. 140 They also detained several members of a well-known sedition ring,
a popular anti-government organization that regularly and publically would call for the
downfall of the regime, demand immediate democratic reforms and remained staunchly
critical of the recent crackdown, another case of selective and nonviolent repression. 141 In
addition, security forces were deployed throughout predominately Shia neighborhoods
and villages that were close to the capital, Manama, to monitor the situation. 142 Targeting
whole cities because of their specific religious sect is a type of indiscriminate and
nonviolent repression technique as people are under suspicious based on factors that have
nothing to do with whether or not they were involved in the protest movements that were
sweeping across the nation.
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On March 18th, the government demolished the monument at Pearl Roundabout, a
very symbolic move but nonetheless a case of nonviolent and selective repression as the
statute was emblematic of the site where the beginning of the uprising began. 143 The
following day, security forces raided the home of Dr. Nada Dhaif and arrested her for
appearing on an al-Jazeera broadcast speaking about the current events in the country. 144
This is classified as a case of selective and nonviolent repression because she was
specifically detained for exercising her right to freedom of speech by discussing the
situation in Bahrain which painted the regime in a negative light. On March 20th, another
similar instance occurred as around 20 to 25 armed men alongside dozens of uniformed
riot police went to the home Nabeel Rajab, the President of the Bahrain Center for
Human Rights and a member of the Middle East advisory committee for Human Rights
Watch, and broke down his door, confiscated some files as well as a computer and
proceeded to take him into custody. 145 Since he was arrested for his human rights work
this is categorized as a case of selective and nonviolent repression. The next day, on the
21st, a well-known opposition activist, Salah al-Khawaja was arrested, adding to the tally
of instances of selective and nonviolent repression. 146
These actions prompted Rupert Colville, the spokesperson for the United Nations
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to publically announce that the
situation in Bahrain was getting very worrisome as he stated, “It is vital that the
authorities scrupulously abide by international standards. People should not be arbitrarily
arrested and should not be detained without clear evidence that they have committed a
recognized crime. We stress again that demonstrating peacefully is not a crime. Giving an
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interview to a journalist is not by any stretch of the imagination a crime, nor is reporting
human rights abuses.” 147
But by the end of the month, the regime had detained around 400 people and
many were held in incommunicado detention as their whereabouts remained a mystery to
their family and friends, and it was reported that only six of them had access to a lawyer
before their trials. 148 The nation-wide apprehension of the most prominent leaders of
political opposition groups, citizens who were the main organizers of the protest
movements as well as doctors, teachers and defense lawyers qualifies as
selective/indiscriminate and nonviolent repression techniques, as certain people were
arrested because of their highly public leadership roles that regularly were very critical of
the regime rendering it as selective while others such as medical personnel were simply
targeted for trying to save the injured make it indiscriminate as well.
By April 1st the Bahraini uprising had been crushed.
Theme of Phase Three of the Uprising
The switch from indiscriminate and violent repression techniques to ones that
were violent albeit more selective during the final phase of the uprising was one of the
main reasons why the ruling al-Khalifa family was successful at returning the country
back to regime stability. Also, the unexpected more frequent use of indiscriminate and
nonviolent repression tactics also added to the country’s success in addition to the cheap
and costly signals from external actors that remained in strong support of the regime.
Therefore, the final theme is that a combination of all of these factors resulted in the
government’s victory as they were finally able to put an end to the ongoing unrest.
The declaration of the State of National Safety which was applied on the
population as a whole was a type of indiscriminate repression tactic as everyone was
effected by it and during this period people’s right to freedom of assembly was severely
restricted as gatherings of any kind were banned. The security forces were extremely
relentless as all protesters at Pearl Roundabout were continually dispersed with teargas,
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rubber bullets and live ammunition. But on top of the government’s selective and violent
measures to disband all demonstrations, they carried out a mass arrest campaign
throughout the remainder of the month in which civilians who were only suspected of
supporting the uprising were detained, in addition to doctors and other medical personnel
who were arrested for treating those wounded during clashes with the regime. This is
classified as indiscriminate and nonviolent repression as people were targeted based
merely on suspicion that they sympathized with the protesters or secretly supported their
activities. Also, taking doctors and nurses into custody for performing their duties of
caring to those requiring medical care is another form of indiscriminate and nonviolent
repression. Although the mass arrest campaign is also classified as selective and
nonviolent repression as prominent government opponents, human rights activists and the
most vocal regime critics were detained, the majority of those that were taken into
custody either had no involvement in the demonstrations themselves or they simply
supported their cause as well as the medical personnel who were also detained.
What was also taking place during the mass arrest campaign was a systematic
purge of employees from various companies who were suspected of supporting the
protest movements or participating in them. A June 29th news release from Human Rights
Watch, reported that over 2,000 people had been fired from their jobs for allegedly being
absent from work during and immediately after the period in which protests had taken
place. 149 But several of those interviewed said that according to law, in order for their
employers to fire them, they would have had to be absent from work for 10 consecutive
days and on the 5th day they were to receive a formal warning, however no one recalled
getting any kind of written notice and several had only been gone from work for around
two or three days. More reports also surfaced that stated that the University of Bahrain
laid off around 100 faculty and staff members for supposedly attending the
demonstrations. Lastly, at the beginning of April, it was recorded that at least 500
students were suspended or expelled from their universities for supporting or actively
participating in the uprising. Also, students that were studying abroad who had been
involved in the protests had lost their government scholarships. 150 All of these instances
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are grouped together and coded as cases of indiscriminate and nonviolent repression
techniques as people lost their jobs, were banned from school and lost their scholarships
for simply being suspected of involvement, supporting or sympathizing with the
protesters and their demonstrations.
Finally, all four sources, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the U.S.
State Department and the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, had no
documented cases in which the GCC’s Joint Security Forces engaged with protesters by
actively repressing them in any way, shape or form. They all described how these troops
were specifically given orders to support the Bahraini authorities by guarding key
government installations so they could carry out the task of brutally repressing their own
citizens. 151 They were also sent to protect the oil fields in the south of the country and
were instructed to always be ready to defend Bahrain against any threat of foreign
intervention. 152 There were no concrete accounts in which the GCC’s troops had been the
sole perpetrators behind suppressing Bahraini citizens, invalidating the claim that the
regime was only able to defeat the uprising thanks to these forces as invalid. But
although they were not actively involved in brutally repressing the protest movements,
the mere presence of the GCC forces may have had a mid deterring effect on the decision
of protesters to not up their rebellious efforts towards engaging in violent conflict with
the state.
This account of the events in Bahrain shows how the type and target of repression
is an important component to take into consideration when attempting to predict the path
of a conflict between a government and its citizens during an emerging uprising which
can either metastasize into civil war onset or not. After thoroughly examining the
dynamic interaction between the Bahraini regime and its citizens during the three distinct
phases of the uprising it shows how the first hypothesis of this thesis is supported.
Escalation theory of civil war onset states that the more indiscriminate and violent the
repression tactics of a regime are, the more likely they are to up the intensity level of the
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protest movements which was exactly what occurred after the first phase of the uprising.
During the initial phase, the use of indiscriminate and violent repression methods caused
the momentum of the protest movements to erupt on a massive scale as the targeting of
civilians based not on their actions but rather because of where they lived, their religious
beliefs or their proximity to an ongoing demonstration enraged a majority of the
population which caused them to join in on the action. 153 After this, the regime tried their
hand at concessions but when that too proved unsuccessful they resorted back to their
violent, but more selective repression tactics. In addition, it is important to note their
widespread use of indiscriminate but nonviolent tactics during the final phase of the
uprising, as several civilians were arrested, workers lost their jobs and students were
dismissed from universities for their suspected involvement in or support of the protests.
Data on Bahrain for the year 2011 was obtained from the Political Terror Scale which
complies an annual report on the human rights practices of all governments with the
primary goal being to measure the level of violence perpetrated by states. They code the
level of political terror and violence that a country undergoes in a particular year based
on a 5-level “terror scale” that was originally developed by Freedom House. Bahrain
received a score of “3” which states that, “There is extensive political imprisonment, or a
recent history of such imprisonment, execution or other political murders and brutality
may be common, unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is
accepted.” 154 This grade of a level three emphasizes the fact that the Bahraini regime
shifted its tactics away from ones that were indiscriminate and violent towards repression
techniques that were violent but more selective alongside methods that were also
indiscriminate but nonviolent in nature that significantly contributed to their ability to
return the country back to its former stable state. The overall consensus here is that the
type and target of repression carried out by the government’s security forces was key in
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determining whether or not they would have a deterrent or backlash effect on the
momentum of the protest movements. 155
But what was also an important component that would effect the outcome of the
uprising had to do with signals from external actors. The most common types of signals
that the regime received from the international community were costly and cheap progovernment ones that offered their verbal support for the ruling al-Khalifa family or gave
them monetary aid to appease protesters growing demands. Signaling theory predicts that
these types of signals from external actors will increase the likelihood that a regime and
its opposition will reach a negotiated settlement to end the rising hostilities for several
reasons. The first is that costly signals made in favor of the regime greatly impact its
challenger’s decision to back down and not escalate their demands while forcing them to
quietly bow out of any further conflict with the state. This is because costly signals that
are sent as a sign of government support are highly visible for the opposition to see thus
increasing their credibility and ensuring to them that outside forces would be willing to
stand by the regime at all costs necessary. These third-party alliances signal to regime
dissidents what to anticipate should they still decide to increase their internal strife with
the state. 156 Second, when pro-government cheap signals are made, although they are not
as reliable as costly ones, it still causes the opposition to second guess whether or not
they want to continue to carry out their activities against the regime and therefore they act
as a deterrent mechanism. Any potential challengers become highly unlikely to initiate
violent force against a government knowing that the rest of the international community
is standing behind it. 157 Therefore, signals from external actors are important
components which are influenced by the type and target of repression tactics carried out
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by the regime that influences whether or not the momentum of protest movements will
lead to civil war onset.
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CHAPTER 5: SYRIA
In 1963 the Syrian Arab Republic experienced a military coup that brought the
Baath Party to power and they enacted the Emergency Law that would remain intact for
the next 48 years to come. Under this state of “eternal lockdown” the government limited
many basic rights of its citizens to maintain their complete dominance over society, in
doing so they restricted public gatherings, authorized the supervision of personal
communications, permitted media censorship and declared all independent political
parties illegal. 158 A few years later in a bloodless coup, General Hafez al-Assad assumed
the office of the presidency. In order to eliminate his opponents, he went to great lengths
to establish a rigid security apparatus which allowed him to sustain control of the
population by severely suppressing all forms of dissent. After his death in late 2000, his
son, Bashar al-Assad became the new President of Syria and continued to govern in
manner that was similar to his late father, meaning that the regime still wielded absolute
authority despite Bashar’s promises of reform. The government sustained the polices in
place that significantly limited citizen’s right to freedom of expression, the ability to
peacefully assemble and was believed to routinely torture political prisoners. 159
Therefore, once the Arab Spring uprisings broke out in Tunisia and Egypt, Bashar alAssad was overly confident that his country was immune to these kinds of protest
movements. During an interview with the Wall Street Journal in January 2011, he stated,
“We have more difficult circumstances than most of the Arab countries but in spite of
that Syria is stable. Why? Because you have to be very closely linked to the beliefs of the
people. This is the core issue. When there is divergence between your policy and the
people's beliefs and interests, you will have this vacuum that creates disturbance...Unless
you understand the ideological aspect of the region, you cannot understand what is
happening.” 160 Ironically enough, it seems that Bashar was the one who was not in tune
with his people’s own ideas and values as months later the country delved into a deadly
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civil war which has persisted for five years now. Several have dubbed the ongoing crisis
as possibly the worst humanitarian catastrophe since World War II, as it has left over a
quarter million dead, nearly the same number of people missing or injured and at least
half of Syria’s 22 million inhabitants displaced from their homes. 161
Background History
Many wondered how this exceedingly authoritarian regime fell victim to the Arab
Spring uprisings after successfully ruling with an iron fist for so many years prior.
Towards the end of 2010, the government was adamant about maintaining a watchful eye
on the current unrest that was sweeping across the region and therefore they decided to
implement a number of measures that were intended to appease the public while
simultaneously improve their image. For starters, President Assad pardoned several
people that had been convicted of major political offenses, attempted to ease economic
hardships by boosting the subsidy on heating fuel and reduced taxes on basic
commodities and lastly, he took small strides towards creating more job opportunities in
both the public and private sectors. 162 But while the regime was busy fine-tuning these
new polices that they hoped would pre-empt a possible crisis, society was slowly but
surely starting to fire up.
The Syrian uprising did not commence in the same fashion as other countries did
where large demonstrations ensued in highly populated areas or capital cities. Instead, it
came about as a quiet encroachment of small protests throughout provincial districts that
each had their own specific grievances unique to their locality. 163 The movements began
spontaneously as they were not coordinated through online social media sites and bore no
organizational structure. At first, they were relatively small in size, peaceful in nature and
addressed legitimate, age-old tribulations that they finally wanted to see resolved.
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Although a few overarching themes could be seen within their demands, such as the
persistent calls to end widespread government corruption, the desire to establish real
democratic institutions, the implementation of long overdue economic reforms and an
overall greater respect for the rule of law. Therefore, despite the considerable differences
between the provinces, they had a shared sense of deep frustration with the regime that
transcended across these disparate towns and gradually evolved into a national protest
movement. 164
Although the government was taking minor steps to entice its citizens, they were
confronted with an unsettling situation as the society that they had long contained and
regulated was suddenly behaving in a way that was completely unfamiliar to them. The
regimes response to the localized protests was to treat every one as an isolated incident,
employ a variety of superficial negotiations mixed with minor concession and top them
off by brutally inhibiting any remaining oppositionists from organizing further
demonstrations. But there was something different this time around, as the barbaric
methods of the regime that, for so many years, worked in suppressing any form of
dissent, was no longer working in their favor. Rather, the excessive use of force led
residents of all localities to rise up in solidarity with the victims of state repression as
they were outraged at the regime’s actions which led them to become active participants
in the protest movements. Around this time, the demands of the people started to shift
away from their specific grievances into a more general call to topple the regime.
But it still remains puzzling as to how one of the most consistently oppressive
regimes failed to quell the momentum of the protest movements. Therefore, it provides
for an interesting research opportunity to take an in-depth look at the specific kind of
repression tactics that were utilized by the government’s security forces that led to civil
war onset instead of regime stability. In carrying out this examination into the specific
dynamics of the uprising, the data was collected following the same procedures that were
used when gathering information on the Bahraini uprising. To refresh, the five sources
that material was obtained from that explicitly had to do with the repression tactics of the
Syrian regime are Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the U.S. State
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Department, the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and the
Political Terror Scale. The material was coded accordingly and sorted into the same four,
overarching categories of repression: violent, nonviolent, indiscriminate and selective. A
chronological presentation of the events that took place will be given along with a
systematic application of thematic analysis that will unmask the distinct kind of state
repression techniques that had an escalatory effect on the momentum of the protest
movements to see if the first hypothesis of this thesis is supported or not, which predicts
that indiscriminate and violent repression will accelerate protest movements while
selective and violent repression will end in a victory for the state. A thick description of
the interactions between the state security forces and the demonstrators will be given to
emphasize the phases and themes of the uprising that ultimately led to the onset of civil
war.
Timeline of the Uprising – Pre-Phase (January 29 – March 15)
Since the Syrian uprising did not begin in the same way as many others in the
region did, it is important to understand the preceding events that led up to the first
outbreak of protests. During this period, the government was very concerned with trying
to pre-empt mass demonstrations from occurring as had happened in Egypt and Tunisia,
which is why their main strategy was to offer concessions, closely monitor known
oppositionists and attempt to persuade people from engaging in these type of activities.
Since the end of January, peaceful gatherings were held as a show of solidarity
with the pro-democracy movements in Egypt and on almost all occasions security forces
showed up to film and check identity papers in which they later used this information to
contact those involved in these small congregations at their private residences to pressure
them to stop attending these events. 165 On February 2nd, the authorities arrested a man in
his mid-70s, Ghassan al-Najjar, after he openly called for the Syrians in Aleppo to rise up
and demand more rights. 166 Two days later on the 4th, more than 10 well-known activists
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were summoned by police officers who insisted that they should refrain from organizing
any type of demonstrations. 167
In the first and third cases, although the regime did not exactly hinder people’s
right to freedom of assembly, by attempting to coerce citizens to cease their activities
acted as a warning sign of what was to come if they continued to disobey these wishes.
But the second incident where a man was arrested for openly expressing his opinions and
ideas violates his right to freedom of speech. Therefore, this is categorized as a type of
nonviolent and selective repression tactic because he was specifically detained due to the
public statement he made against the government and which they feared could incite a
possible crisis for them. This was essentially how the pre-phase period to the protest
movements occurred, as once civilians started to muster the courage to speak out against
these long-standing oppressive measures, the regime’s security apparatuses were quick to
pre-empt any situation from spiraling out of control.
But in the southwestern city of Dara’a on March 6th, the regime had taken their
strategy of pre-empting all political opponents way too far as police arrested roughly
fifteen school children between the ages of 10-15 for spray painting one of their school
walls with the phrase, “The people want to topple the regime.” 168 This sparked major
outrage from Dara’a residents, especially the children’s parents, as they were only kids
who were not intending to stage mass demonstrations themselves but were merely
mimicking popular slogans from other Arab Spring uprisings. Therefore, although they
were writing anti-regime sayings, this still qualifies as a kind of indiscriminate, not
selective, repression tactic due to the innocence that comes with their young age as some
could not even be considered as “pre-teens” yet. It is labeled as nonviolent for now
because it was initially unfathomable that the security forces would have the audacity to
inflict pain on harmless children.
Timeline of the Uprising – Phase One (March 16 – April 7)
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This timeframe marks the initiation of the Syrian uprising although the protests
remained mostly localized in one of Syria’s 14 governorates, Dara’a, a few
demonstrations were held outside of this area as well. Since the government’s security
apparatuses were not accustomed to dealing with citizen’s defiant behavior, as no one
normally dared to speak out against the regime for fear of the consequences, they were
ill-equipped with the knowledge needed to properly mitigate many of these early
situations. Instead they resorted to their normal courses of action that they were used to
when dealing with even the slightest form of dissent which was to contain the protest
movements by all means necessary. This stage highlights how the regime’s repression
techniques against peaceful protesters slowly started to evolve from nonviolent tactics to
ones that were more aggressive and indiscriminate in nature which also caused the
signals from external actors to shift as they began sending more signals expressing their
deep concerns at the deteriorating situation in the country that were not in favor of the
regime.
A little over a week later on March 16th, around 150 human rights activists and
relatives of detainees congregated outside the Ministry of Interior in Damascus to
publically demand the release of the country’s political prisoners but within a matter a
minutes, security forces disguised in plain clothing began attacking them with batons. By
the time that this rally had been dispersed, 34 people had been detained for their
participation. 169 This marked one of the first instances that the regime overtly violated
people’s right to freedom of assembly by using violent and selective repression tactics as
they publically assaulted protesters outside one of the government’s main institutions.
Two days later on the 18th, mass demonstrations were held in Dara’a to signify
residents’ unity in their shared feeling of utmost repugnance at the government for not yet
releasing the schoolboys who had been arrested two weeks earlier. The movement began
after Friday morning prayers at al-Omari mosque and security officers initially began
assaulting people with batons but when that failed to quell the rising tensions they
methodically aimed water cannons directly into the crowd to disperse the protest. By the
end of the day they had opened fire on unarmed demonstrators leaving a few killed and
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dozens injured. These actions are all categorized as violent and selective repression
techniques as protesters were the ones being targeted with violent force. While all of this
was happening, other military troops were dispatched to Dara’a to seal of the city,
allowing people to leave but prohibiting anyone from entering. 170 This was one of the
regime’s beliefs that by restricting people’s access to Dara’a they could avert political
chaos from spreading elsewhere throughout the country. It also qualifies as a type of
indiscriminate and nonviolent repression method as all Syrians, not just a select few,
were prevented from entering the city, thus hindering their ability to move freely as they
please. Additionally, as a gesture of goodwill, the 15 school children were finally
released to their families after spending nearly two weeks in jail. But what was hoped to
end the mounting animosity towards the al-Assad regime, only inflamed the already tense
situation, as the mere sight of the children’s severely beaten, bruised and burned bodies
was the fuel that sparked the protest movements to grow like wildfire. Therefore, this is
why the original categorization of their arrest as a case of nonviolent and indiscriminate
repression is now classified as indiscriminate and violent because their disfigured
physiques clearly showed that they had been extensively tortured during their
incarceration. 171
As the day came to a close, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made one of
his first public announcements addressing the current situation in Syria. He stressed that
the use of such deadly force against peaceful protesters and their capricious arrests would
not be tolerated which is why he strongly urged the Syrian authorities to cease these types
of actions against their own citizens immediately. 172 This is classified as a neutral cheap
signal as it was not openly condemning the Syrian regime’s security forces activities but
rather served as a warning sign to them if they failed to take this advice into serious
consideration.
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On the 19th, thousands attended a funeral procession in Dara’a for two
demonstrators that had been killed the day prior. But the police and military forces feared
that such a large gathering of people would metastasize into another mass protest which
is why they decided to discharge teargas on those in mourning. This use of unnecessary
force against grieving civilians is classified as an instance of indiscriminate and violent
repression. To add insult to injury, the government also disconnected all phone services
throughout the entire city, both landlines and cell phones included, although they were
restored later on the next day. 173 Preventing everyone in a specific town from being able
to communicate with others residing outside of their area is a kind of indiscriminate and
nonviolent repression tactic as their right to contact people at their own discretion is
inhibited.
After the school children had been released and residents not only witnessed but
were subjected to the brutality of the Syrian regime’s security forces, the situation in
Dara’a rapidly began to escalate. On the 20th rallies were staged throughout the city
which were met with copious amounts of teargas and live ammunition from police
officers and military troops, making this yet another instance where they security forces
utilized selective and violent repression techniques to disband protest movements. 174 In
addition, the government also started cracking down on people who were reaching out to
foreign news media outlets to describe the current situation. During this day as well, they
detained a man named Rami Sulayman, from a neighboring town of Dara’a for calling
the BBC news station to describe the unraveling crisis and two days later on the 22nd, a
similar incident occurred as Louay Hussein was arrested for his online activities in which
he was prompting Syrians to actively take to the streets. 175 Both of these arrests are
grouped together as instances of nonviolent and selective repression as the government
was restricting their freedom of communication through various mediums such as online
social forums or highly broadcasted international reports.
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On this day as well, the European Union decided to actively speak out against
Bashar al-Assad’s government as they openly condemned the security forces violent
repression tactics, specifically citing their disgust at the use of live ammunition against
unarmed demonstrators. 176 The press release also called on the Syrian authorities to halt
their use of such brutal aggression towards their own citizens and opt for a more
nonviolent approach to address their grievances instead of taking up arms against
innocent civilians. This public announcement qualifies as a cheap and anti-regime signal
as the whole European Union overtly denounced the actions of the regime’s troops.
Midday on the 23rd, residents of Dara’a were gathered together in the al-Omari
mosque that was being used as a makeshift hospital for the wounded at the time when
security forces hurled teargas canisters inside and proceeded to enter while open firing on
everyone inside, resulting in 8 deaths, one of which was a child. 177 Physically harming
people while they are first of all not involved in protesting at the time of attack, second of
all are tending to the injured and third of all are in a place of worship qualifies as a clearcut case of indiscriminate and violent repression. Later in the evening, more protests
erupted throughout the city and in the outskirts of town in small villages and both were
met with teargas and live ammunition once again, adding this to the tally of the number
of times the government’s security services resorted to selective and violent repression
techniques. 178
The more protests that began taking place in the city of Dara’a the more the
security forces were instructed to use indiscriminate and violent repression tactics to
contain the rallies from spreading else where throughout the country. But unlike the
uprising in Bahrain, the situation in Syria was put on everyone’s global radar as many
more international, regional and domestic organizations started to comment on the
unraveling crisis. On March 23rd, the Secretary-General issued his second condemnation
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against the violent force being inflicted upon the peaceful demonstrators in Dara’a and
called for an instant investigation to take place to hold those responsible for the killings
accountable for such atrocities. 179 Additionally, the U.S. Department of State issued a
public statement also condemning the al-Assad regime while simultaneously expressing
their most sincere condolences to the families who had lost their loved ones due to the
violent repression tactics of the government’s security forces. 180 Both of these are
grouped together and coded as instances in which cheap, anti-regime signals were sent
against the reigning al-Assad family as the comments were clearly not made in favor of
the government.
In Dara’a on the 25th, funerals were being held for civilians that had been slain by
the regime’s forces and people from one of Dara’a’s three districts, Sanamein, attempted
to enter the city to pay their respects alongside tens of thousands of mourners already in
attendance. But on their way there they encountered troops who were blocking them from
continuing on their way and when they refused to stop they opened fire on all of them. 181
These more frequent uses of indiscriminate and violent repression tactics being carried
out by the government’s military, police and security services shows how they began
escalating their techniques as more and more incidents like this one were occurring on an
almost daily basis in which unarmed civilians who were not actively engaged in
protesting at the time of attack were targeted. Also during this time, citizens started to
behave in a more aggressive manner, as two incidents were reported, the first in which a
few protesters tried to destroy a statue of the former President, Hafez al-Assad and the
second which occurred a day later on the 26th where demonstrators attempted to set
ablaze the headquarters of the ruling Baath Party and a police station. 182 This highlights
how the dynamic interaction between the regime and protesters began to escalate as both
were now becoming more aggressive towards one another, not just simply the
government anymore.
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By the end of the month, around 93 citizens were detained and being held
incommunicado detention and at least 99 people were reported to have been killed by the
government’s security apparatuses. 183
On the first day of April, demonstrations were held in other areas outside of
Dara’a, showing how the uprising was gaining more momentum as protests began
spreading to various parts of the country. In the city of Douma, in the Damascus
governorate, police and mukhabarat forces responded to a rally by launching teargas
canisters into the massive crowds of people and opened fire at the nonviolent
demonstrators, resulting in at least 8 known casualties. 184 The continued use of violent
force against peaceful protesters are more instances that are characterized as the use of
selective and violent repression tactics as they are aimed at people who are merely trying
to exercise their right to freedom of assembly.
Theme of Phase One of the Uprising
The first theme of the Syrian uprising is very similar to that of Bahrain’s, as this
period emphasized how the regime’s repression tactics began to shift away from more
nonviolent methods in favor of ones that were aggressive and indiscriminate in nature but
that also only succeeded in upping the momentum of the protest movements. But it was
dissimilar to the uprising in Bahrain regarding the signals from external actors as most of
the international community was much quicker to condemn the al-Assad regime’s
security forces actions than they were in Bahrain.
It was around March 18th that the demonstrations really started to take off as
Dara’a residents were demanding the release of the schoolboys who had been detained
two weeks earlier. The al-Assad regime decided that it would be in their best interest to
free the boys and send them back home to their families. However, when their parents
saw them for the first time since their arrest, it sparked mass outrage as their bodies
showed signs of prolonged and severe torture. Shortly thereafter, the protests started
multiplying daily as citizens were not only calling on the government to meet all of their
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political, economic and social needs, they now also demanded justice for the atrocities
that were committed against defenseless children. As the regime was determined to keep
these bouts of dissent localized to the city of Dara’a, the security forces were instructed to
use any means necessary to do so, which is why during the following weeks their use of
violent and indiscriminate repression tactics were becoming more widespread. Policemen
and military troops systematically opened fire on people attending funeral processions, in
places of worship and against unarmed civilians who were simply attempting to reach
their friends and loved ones in Dara’a. These more frequent uses of indiscriminate and
violent repression techniques are comparable to the tactics used by the security forces in
Bahrain during the beginning phase of their uprising as well. In both cases, each
government’s use of these kind of repression methods only worked in escalating the
energy of the protest movements as more and more civilians became active participants.
Although it is important to point out that the Syrian government utilized far
crueler violent and indiscriminate repression tactics in addition to harsher nonviolent and
indiscriminate methods as well when compared to what the Bahraini authorities carried
out. The al-Khalifa family did not purposely target, detain and torture children or order
blockades to be imposed around whole cities, preventing civilians from entering or
exiting, as the al-Assad regime did. This is why there were a few documented incidents in
which protesters were behaving violently, albeit not directly against the security forces
but against more emblematic sites and places as they attempted to demolish a statue of
the former President, Hafez al-Assad and attempted to set fire to the Baath Party’s main
office as well as a police station. This signifies how the dynamic interaction between the
regime and its dissidents began to escalate as both were now becoming increasingly more
aggressive towards one another. These limited occurrences foreshadowed the violence
that would eventually ensue between the al-Assad government and its citizens, as
indiscriminate repression tends to push protesters towards more militant strategies to
achieve their desired goals and a state that continues to cast the net of repression widely
is more and more likely to be viewed as illegitimate. 185 Also, this stage highlights how
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the use of indiscriminate and violent repression caused more protests to erupt in small
villages on the outskirts of Dara’a. Especially since by April 1st, the first large-scale
rallies were held outside of this location and every single one was met with an over
abundant use of violent force as the police and mukhabarat launched teargas canisters,
rubber bullets and opened fire with live ammunition at all participants. This follows the
hypothesized direction of protest movements according to escalation theory as the more
indiscriminate the repression tactics of a regime are, the more likely it is to create
incentives for mobilization. 186
What is also important to address in the first theme of the Syrian uprising is how
prominent external actors and international governmental organizations denounced the
actions of the al-Assad regime in a much quicker fashion when compared to their initial
responses to the reigning al-Khalifa family’s activities during the beginning stages of the
uprising in Bahrain. Within a timeframe just short of a week, the United Nations,
European Union and U.S. Department of State had all publically condemned the Syrian
government and some expressed their deepest condolences to the families who had lost
their loved ones to do the rising escalation of violence. They had also called to attention
that the use of such force would not be tolerated by members of the global community or
within their home states but when looking at their announcements towards Bahrain, they
merely expressed mild concerns and hoped that a national dialogue would take place
between the country’s leaders and its main opposition. But the repression tactics of the
ruling al-Assad regime during this first phase of the uprising were slightly more violent
and indiscriminate than the Bahraini regimes were which caused an increase in the
number of cheap anti-government signals to be sent against the Syrian government thus
effecting the rate of escalation as dissidents began to notice that the regime did not
seemingly have the support or backing from powerful international figures and therefore
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began to up their demands. 187 In a final attempt to ultimately spur potential challengers
into submission the Syrian regime increased the brutality against protesters to a new
level, as they were clearly not willing to offer any meaningful concessions in the near
future.
Timeline of the Uprising – Phase Two (April 8 –April 24)
This stage marked a turning point as the Syrian regime’s repression tactics
became exceedingly brutal and more indiscriminate than before which in turn effected the
momentum of the protest movements as they started to spread into neighboring
governorates to the south and west of Dara’a. It was during this period as well that the
signals from external actors were seldom as they were waiting to see if Bashar al-Assad
would adhere to their previous advice and switch his security forces methods towards
more nonviolent ones when dealing with the unarmed demonstrators.
A week later on April 8th, large demonstrations were held in two of the main
villages in Dara’a, al-Mahatta and al-Balad. In both instances, the security service
members responded with their usual tactics by tossing teargas canisters and opening fire
into the large crowds of people. 188 But their weapon of choice this time to shoot at
unarmed demonstrators was with Kalashnikovs, a lethal assault riffle that can either be
set to single or automatic shot mode and when it is operating in the latter it can be fired at
a rate of 600 rounds per minute although it can only hold up to 30 rounds at a time which
will empty in just over 3 seconds. 189 Snipers were also systematically positioned
throughout the area discharging their weapons at unsuspecting victims. The regime’s
decision to have the security forces use this type of lethal weaponry against defenseless
protesters and have snipers deployed in the city is a primary example of how their
selective and violent repression tactics began to spiral out of control. In addition to this,
the troops set up a major roadblock on one of the main bridges between the two villages
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to prevent people from crossing over to reach one another. They also stopped all
ambulances that were sent to the scene to retrieve the injured from doing so and
surrounded several hospitals in the area, inhibiting people requiring urgent medical
treatment to get the help they so desperately needed. Restricting people’s freedom of
movement, preventing medical personnel from tending to the wounded and stopping
citizens that were hurt from entering hospitals are all categorized as indiscriminate and
nonviolent repression tactics as those who were targeted were not actively engaged in
protesting but were either simply trying to move about freely, perform their job’s duties
or receive medical assistance.
On the same day in Douma, officers sealed off the whole city, stopping anyone
from entering or exiting because they feared that the events happening in Dara’a would
provoke citizens in this town to follow suit as they had recently engaged in small scale
protests themselves only a week earlier. Again, an instance of indiscriminate and
nonviolent repression as everyone was either prevented from entering or leaving a
specific area, although there were various accounts that stated the officers used violent
tactics as well to stop people from passing through the town.
In one account, a witness told Human Rights Watch that three men all on one
motorcycle reached the entrance of Douma only to encounter a large group of riot control
units from the security forces who proceeded to tell them to turn around and go on their
way. They followed orders and began to do so when all of a sudden one of the
servicemen shot at them with his pistol.190 This repression method in this case is branded
as indiscriminate and violent as a security member discharged his weapon against people
who were abiding by their commands and who posed no imminent danger to their lives.
In another testimony, two doctors from Harasta, a suburb of Douma, told Human Rights
Watch that they had tended to several protesters within the last few days as well as
countless injured civilians, all of which had bullet wounds lodged in various parts of their
bodies and many of them were also children. 191 This shows how the repression tactics of
the government were remaining extremely violent and becoming more and more
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indiscriminate as not only protesters, but civilian bystanders and even children were hit
with live ammunition.
The following day, on April 9th in the western governorate of Tartus, the regime’s
troops besieged yet another town, the coastal city of Banias as they set up multiple
checkpoints to control the entry and exit to the city and in addition, they also decided to
cut off all water supplies and electricity as well. 192 After the events of the previous day,
the government feared that people would start revolting here as they had begun to in
Douma which is why they hoped this would pre-empt any attempted demonstrations from
arising here. Hindering access to a city is, as previously stated, a type of indiscriminate
and nonviolent repression method but it highlights how the government was applying
harsher measures in doing so by stopping citizen’s from having basic necessities such as
water and electricity. By the end of the day, the European Union’s High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, spoke on their behalf when
she proclaimed, "I strongly condemn the continuing violence and deaths in Syria in the
context of protests calling for freedom and democracy. I sincerely regret the loss of life,
particularly in the Southern city of Daraa, and extend my condolences to the families of
the victims. I urge in the strongest terms the Syrian authorities to immediately put an end
to the violence.” 193 This statement is a cheap, anti-regime signal as the EU wanted to
voice their unwavering stance against the repression tactics of the al-Assad regime by
publically denouncing their activities once again.
Out of sheer panic, on the 21st, President Assad issued decrees to finally lift the
State of Emergency that had been in place for 48 years, eradicate the state security courts
and to officially recognize and regulate citizen’s right to peacefully assemble. 194 But
what he had sneakily added to these seemingly groundbreaking concessions was a final
decree that allowed the security forces to hold a person who was suspected to be involved
in certain crimes against the state from 1 to 7 days before allowing them access to a
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lawyer. These last-ditch efforts to appease the population was too little too late, as
citizens had already witnessed the brutality of the regime’s security forces and no one
truly believed that anything was going to change for the better. 195
The next day, thousands of people in various parts of the country took to the
streets showing that the concessions offered by the al-Assad regime were merely
cosmetic in their minds and what they actually wanted was real reform not just simply the
façade of change, in addition to justice for those who had been killed by the security
forces while they were peacefully protesting. But not surprisingly, the government troops
responded to the mass demonstrations that erupted in Douma, Homs, Damascus and
Maadamiya by opening fire into the large crowds of people and in Khalidiyyah, a
neighborhood in Homs, it was reported that military personnel were using Kalashnikovs
to shoot at protesters. 196 In all of these cases, this type of brutal force is classified as
violent and selective repression techniques as all of those who were targeted were
actively engaged in protesting at the time of attack. In Ezraa, one of the three districts of
the Dara’a governorate, witnesses described an incident in which officers were sniping
victims from the top of a building which resulted in the death of a 7-year-old child along
with three other young boys who were also hit in the head and died instantaneously. In
the suburb of Othman, a witness told Human Rights Watch that they saw a 23-year-old
man attempting to return home when mukhabarat forces told him to halt and as he
proceeded to get off his bike, they shot him directly in the head. 197 Both of these
instances qualify as indiscriminate and violent repression as those who were targeted
were only children or merely trying to get home to their families when they were
assaulted by these barbaric acts.
On the 23rd in Harasta, a neighborhood in the Douma district, peaceful
demonstrations started to occur but were disbanded by the regime’s security services who
proceeded to open fire at the unarmed participants which qualifies this as an instance of
violent and selective repression. But months later, a former member of the Syrian
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Republic Guard named Walid ‘Abd al-Karim al-Qash’ami told Amnesty International
that he was condemned to death in Syria as he refused to shoot at protesters on this day
after witnessing soldiers indiscriminately execute three children and a young man and
women. He said, “One of the children was shot in the head by an officer who was
standing right in front of me. I heard the officer say that he shot the kid because he was
annoyed with his constant crying.” 198 During this day, funeral processions were held in
Douma, Barza and Ezraa and those in mourning were shot at by the regime’s security
forces, branding this as another act of indiscriminate and violent repression as people
were targeted while they were paying their respects for those they had lost. 199
Theme of Phase Two of the Uprising
The theme of this stage of the uprising is that the indiscriminate and violent
repression tactics of the Syrian regime became even more exceedingly brutal than before
which in turn caused the one thing the government feared the most to happen, which is
that the protest movements spread even further into neighboring governorates and not just
in nearby villages of Dara’a anymore. Throughout this phase, the security forces methods
for disbanding protests were similar to the Bahraini regimes security forces although as
time progressed, the Syrian government decided to use lethal weaponry and snipers
against demonstrators and eventually on unsuspecting civilians as well. But the signals
from external actors were few and far during this phase as it acted as a kind of incubation
period because the international community was waiting to see if the Syrian regime
would adhere to their advice as the Bahraini regime did during the first portion of the
second phase of their uprising.
At first, the police and military troops consistently resorted to launching teargas
canisters into large crowds of people and opened fire with live ammunition, which was in
line with the tactics utilized by the Bahraini security forces. They also prevented
ambulances from reaching the wounded and injured civilians from entering hospitals to
receive medical treatment which was also comparable to the methods employed in
Bahrain. But on April 8th, the regime’s security apparatuses used deadly assault rifles,
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Kalashnikovs, to fire at unarmed demonstrators and innocent civilians who were
approaching them, in addition to snipers who were shooting at unwary protesters and
citizens throughout the day. The al-Assad regime’s unwavering decision to use this kind
of lethal weaponry against peaceful protesters and innocent civilians, on top of having
snipers methodically placed throughout towns clearly highlights how the indiscriminate
and violent repression tactics began to inch towards the point of no return. But despite
this aggressive use of violent force against them, Syrians were unrelenting as these tactics
only continued to enflame their rage towards the regime, especially at the ease in which
the regime carried out such gross violations of human rights and other unspeakable
atrocities against civilians, young children and the elderly.
The security forces use of indiscriminate and violent repression was evolving into
a clear, patterned reaction as reports began to multiply which thoroughly described how
these troops were either aimlessly firing on civilians, shooting directly at people who
were trying to obey their orders or killing people simply because they were on their
nerves. Also, several doctors relived the days when they received many dead bodies, all
of which had been shot many times and several of the corpses they got were of young
children, further elucidating the regime’s lack of basic humanity. Finally, President Assad
attempted to offer concessions in hopes of halting the rapidly increasing momentum of
the uprising, but as in the same case of Bahrain, they did little to appease the population
as they had already born witness to the atrocities the regime was capable of and
demanded justice for those injured and killed. Therefore, although the Bahraini and
Syrian regimes both initially responded to the protest movements with violent aggression
that was mostly indiscriminate in nature, overtime the tactics of al-Assad’s security
forces became increasingly more deadly and widespread whereas the Bahraini
government at least tried harder to offer meaningful concessions to its citizens. It is
during this phase in which the repression techniques of both regimes initially start to shift
further away from one another. As this stage of the uprising came to a close, although
external actors only rarely took a position during this period, the signals that were sent
were all cheap, anti-regime ones that overtly condemned the actions of the al-Assad
government. This foreshadowed what was to come in the final stage of the uprising
which would highlight how the increase in the use of indiscriminate and violent
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repression tactics prompted external actors to send a multitude of cheap anti-government
signals that increased the likelihood that mutual negotiations would be reached between
the government and its opposition. According to signaling theory, cheap signals matter in
bargaining processes and normally, when third parties offer cheap signals in favor of the
government, it is the oppositional forces that accede some of their demands which gives
the regime the upper hand. 200 But in this case, as the signals that were sent were more in
favor of the opposition, it decreased their willingness to bargain with the government and
opt for incurring the costs of engaging in violent conflict with the regime instead.
Timeline of the Uprising – Phase Three (April 25–September 30)
It was during this stage of the uprising that the regime’s indiscriminate and
violent repression tactics had reached their apex, as the protest movements had spread
beyond the localized provinces and into several surrounding cities throughout the
country. The security forces met all the demonstrations with the same exceedingly
sadistic measures that they were used to employing before when they successfully
eliminated any traces of government opposition. It was also during this stage that external
actors became remarkably vocal in their condemnation of the al-Assad regime as they
started to threaten them with sanctions as well as alluding to the fact that the international
community was willing to aid the anti-government forces should push come to shove.
On April 25th, severe anguish consumed Syria as the security officers unleashed
their most oppressive tactics to date. They completely encapsulated the city of Dara’a by
occupying every neighborhood within the city and ordered everyone to remain inside
their homes which had their electricity, internet and phone services totally cut off. 201 This
siege lasted for 11 days straight, during which all humanitarian aid, such as copious
supplies of medicine and food, were also prevented from reaching the residents. All of
these actions are grouped as indiscriminate and nonviolent repression tactics as a whole
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city was prevented from freely moving about, in addition to being denied the right to
have basic necessities available to them such as water and electricity, as well as
restricting people from brining them humanitarian supplies to ease the burden of being
under government lockdown. To top it all off, snipers were stationed with heavy machine
guns all around the city on top of buildings that were instructed to open fire on anyone
approaching them or those who dared to defy the ban on movement and chose to leave
their houses. 202 This qualifies as indiscriminate and violent repression because shooting
at innocent civilians for simply leaving their place of residence is not something that
warrants this kind of brutal response from people’s own government.
On the 25th as well, the rapidly increasing levels of violent and indiscriminate
repression prompted the UN Secretary-General to once again overtly denounce the brutal
aggression being inflicted upon unarmed demonstrators, although he did acknowledge
Bashar al-Assad’s lifting of the State of Emergency that had been in place for 48 years,
he still adamantly maintained that an effective dialogue must be taken with the regime
and its opposition immediately. 203 Two days later on April 27th, various member states of
the United Nations took to the floor to continue their criticism and condemnation of
Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The United State’s representative to the UN called on the
Syrian government to “change course now” and staunchly stated that the international
community must stand behind this goal and if the violent repression was not
instantaneously halted that America was going to implement a wide range of sanctions on
the country. The United Kingdom’s representative to the UN, Mark Lyall Grant also
condemned the regime without any reservation and said that his country was also
considering targeted sanctions against specific high-ranking members of the Syrian
regime if the violence did not end. Lastly, France’s representative, Gérard Araud, joined
in on denouncing the actions of the Syrian government’s security forces against peaceful
protesters, human rights activists and journalists. Several other country representatives
voiced their disapproval of the regime’s repression tactics but did not outright condemn
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the government as a whole. 204 Also on this day, the United States issued a press release
which denounced in the strongest manner possible the repugnant repression techniques
being utilized by the Syrian government on their own people while announcing that they
were going to respond to the outrageous and continuing use of violent and indiscriminate
repression with targeted sanctions. 205 All of these statements are classified as cheap and
anti-regime signals because they were openly and harshly critical of the al-Assad regime
and the threatening of targeted sanctions fits under the category of cheap because it
attempts to pressure Syria into getting in line with their demands or else face the
consequences.
Four days later on the 29th, thousands from towns surrounding Dara’a attempted
to break the blockade but as they reached the Sayda residence complex, the military
forces ambushed them by indiscriminately firing live ammunition into the massive scores
of civilians which in the end led to at least 40 known casualties that included women and
children. 206 The high number of fatalities on this day provoked President Obama to sign
an Executive Order that imposed targeted sanctions against specific Syrian officials that
had committed gross human rights abuses that were now occurring at an alarming rate
throughout the entire country against the majority of the population. 207 President Obama
also condemned Bashar al-Assad’s regime for ignoring the calls to end the brutality
against his own citizens. Also, the United Nations issued a public statement that
unequivocally denounced the Syrian governments use of deadly force against unarmed
protesters and criticized how they prevented demonstrators from having access to urgent
medical treatment as well. 208 These instances qualify as cheap and anti-regime signals
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that were sent as restrictions were placed on various members of the al-Assad
government, in addition to the ongoing condemnation of their atrocious actions.
It did not take long until the next press release from the U.S. Department of State
to be released on May 6th, which once again condemned in the strongest possible terms
the actions of the Syrian government over the course of the last month and a half. But
unlike before, they started to up their threats as the announcement proclaimed that Bashar
al-Assad’s security forces violent repression tactics were, “Neither those of a responsible
government nor a credible member of the international community.” 209 It also stated that
the American government was willing and ready to work unilaterally and multilaterally
with its international partners to develop a comprehensive plan that would be the most
effective should the Syrian regime decide not to abandon its current violent path. This
statement is classified as an extremely cheap, anti-government signal as it was one of the
first instances in which the Syrian regime was described basically as illegitimate and
foreshadowed what was to come as the country was seemingly not going to comply with
the demands of the global community.
On May 7th, security forces entered the town of Tafas by firing aimlessly into the
air in order to scare people into their homes and an incident occurred in which snipers
stationed methodically on a rooftop opened fire on a group of civilians leaving the market
place. Also, later in the day around 100 people tried to escape the village through
Yarmuk valley but were hunted down like animals by military personnel who also
proceeded to open fire on them. 210 On May 9th, similar tactics were employed in Banias
as security officers using tanks fired shells into the residential area of Ras al-Naba and
killed four people. 211 The incidents that occurred on both of these days are grouped
together and classified as more cases in which the regimes many security apparatuses
utilized indiscriminate and violent repression tactics against unarmed civilians.
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In the Homs governorate district of Tell Kalakh on the 15th, a devastating
campaign of violent and indiscriminate repression was carried out by the regime’s
security forces as several atrocious incidents ranging from murder, torture, random
arrests and severe denials of basic civil liberties were reported. 212 All of these actions
were taken deliberately to cause immense suffering to citizens mental and physical
wellbeing. Around two weeks later on April 29th, the military forces again proceeded to
march through the towns of Talbiseh, Deir Ba’albeh, Teir Ma’alleh and Rastan with tanks
that had machine guns mounted on them which began shelling and shooting at civilian’s
private residences. 213
As the weeks progressed and the Syrian regime was not backing down or
acceding to the calls from the global community to end their violent repression tactics
against peaceful protesters and innocent civilians, various international organizations and
heads of state actively denounced Bashar al-Assad’s government in numerous press
releases and public speeches as well as taking concrete actions against the country by
imposing more crippling sanctions. On May 18th, the European Union took drastic steps
to attempt to get the Syrian regime to change their policies regarding the use of
repression to subdue the ongoing demonstrations with the hopes of promoting a
democratic process instead by implementing an arms embargo against the regime. 214 The
next day President Obama gave a very significant speech addressing U.S. policies in the
Middle East and North Africa in which he made a number of statements that were
extremely telling about America’s future intentions for the al-Assad regime. The usual
condemnations were made against the security services use of force but what was
different about this public announcement was that President Obama bluntly stated,
“President Assad now has a choice: He can lead that transition, or get out of the way.” 215
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These two statements are characterized as cheap, anti-regime signals as they clearly were
made against the al-Assad regime as both openly condemned the security forces atrocities
and President Obama signaled that Assad was finished if he continued to carry on as so.
A few days later on May 23rd, the European Union adopted new strategies hoped to
effectively deal with Syria as the Union agreed to suspend all preparations that were
being made regarding new bilateral cooperation programs with the country, in addition to
suspending all current bilateral programs that were already in place under the European
Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument that were tailored to help build relations
specifically with Meditarianean countries. 216 They also extended their restrictive
measures to include more people close to the regime as well as President Bashar al-Assad
himself. Finally, the EU proudly proclaimed that they would not be shy to take further
action necessary should the leadership still continue to not change its current path.
Therefore, on June 2nd, President Bashar al-Assad announced the creation of the
National Dialogue Commission that was tasked with the responsibility of preparing
consultations between opposition groups but several boycotted this attempt at
establishing a transitional process towards a multiparty democracy due to the continued
violence used against nonviolent demonstrations and innocent civilians. 217
During June 20th, protests were held in al-Khalidiyah but were met with teargas
and live ammunition from the security forces which makes this an instance where violent
and selective repression methods were used in attempts to quell the momentum of the
movements from gaining any further strength.
Now although the regime was trying to act as if they were committed to ending
the use of ongoing violence against demonstrators, on July 2nd, President Assad fired the
governor of Hama, Ahmad Khalid Abdel Aziz, for for neglecting to repress a massive,
peaceful protest at al-Assi square. 218
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In the Qatana district of the Damascus governorate on July 16th, the regime
resumed their indiscriminate and violent/nonviolent repression tactics by imposing an
11AM curfew on all of the towns inhabitants, cut off their water and electricity and
conducted house-by-house raids in which they arbitrarily arrested numerous people and
continued to fire on residential areas injuring a number of civilians. 219 Three days later on
the 19th, pro-government militias and security forces targeted people attending a funeral
near the Khalid bin al-Waleed mosque in Homs with automatic weapons that were
mounted on top of vehicles. On the 21st, officers blocked of the village of Bab ‘Sba and
opened fire at pedestrians trying to enter the town and reports surfaced that described
how snipers shot at those on bicycle and others attempting to bring food and medicine to
the residents. 220 On this day as well, troops sealed off multiple neighborhoods throughout
the Homs, restricting people’s freedom of movement, a kind of indiscriminate and
nonviolent tactic that was so frequently utilized by the security forces.
By July 29th, the Free Syrian Army had formed. 221
About a week after this, the Gulf countries finally started to take serious action
against President Assad’s most recent brutal crackdown. On August 7th, Saudi Arabia’s
former ruler, the late King Abdullah recalled his ambassador from Syria, prompting
Bahrain and Syria to follow suit only hours later as they also withdrew their envoys from
the country as well. 222 The next day, King Abdullah condemned the Syrian regime and
proclaimed in a written statement, “What is happening in Syria is not acceptable for
Saudi Arabia. Syria should think wisely before it’s too late and issue and enact reforms
that are not merely promises but actual reform. Either it chooses wisdom on its own or it
will be pulled down into the depths of turmoil and loss.” 223 Both of these instances
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qualify as cheap, anti-regime signals as removing ambassadors to the country sends a
clear message to the opposition that the government is no longer an acceptable authority
in which their states are willing to conduct business with.
A good amount of time had passed and the atrocities were only mounting as the
Syrian regime was becoming more brutal as every day went by and the oppositional
forces were engaging in violent clashes with the security forces as well. In a speech on
September 21st, President Obama made it clear that the al-Assad regime was no longer
the legitimate ruling authority in the eyes of America. In his most striking statement yet
he said, “The Syrian people have shown dignity and courage in their pursuit of justice -protesting peacefully, standing silently in the streets, dying for the same values that this
institution is supposed to stand for. And the question for us is clear: Will we stand with
the Syrian people, or with their oppressors?..... There's no excuse for inaction. Now is the
time for the United Nations Security Council to sanction the Syrian regime, and to stand
with the Syrian people.” 224 This concluding remark by President Obama is a cheap and
anti-government signal as it openly states that they are done trying to work with the
government anymore as they were continuously unwilling to implement any meaningful
change towards a national dialogue aimed at a democratic transition to adhere to the
demands of its citizens.
Theme of Phase Three of the Uprising
The theme of this phase of the uprising is that the repression tactics of the regime,
which had reached their most inhuman level yet during this period, combined with the
dramatically increasing statements from external actors that are classified as cheap, antiregime signals, essentially caused local defense committees and the Free Syrian Army to
form as citizens wanted to protect themselves and their families from the brutalities of the
government But despite the creation of these organizations that were comprised of
regular civilians and military defectors, the al-Assad regime continued to conduct their
vicious repression methods with the same sadistic vigor as before.
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The oppressive tactics included placing a number of cities on lockdown,
sometimes for weeks on end, which was the case in Dara’a as security forces blockaded
off the entire town to prevent civilians from entering and exiting as well as prohibiting
humanitarian supplies of food and medicine to be brought in for the residents. They also
held various towns throughout the Homs governorate under siege and in the city of
Qatana, they implemented an 11AM curfew and restricted civilians access to water and
electricity. In all cases where entire towns were sealed off from the rest of the population,
the military troops conducted abhorrently indiscriminate and violent repression
techniques as they regularly targeted residential areas with live ammunition initially as a
scare tactic that evolved into a regular repression method, snipers opened fire on any
person who dared to disobey their orders to remain indoors and they conducted door-todoor raids, arbitrarily arresting anyone suspected of supporting or being involved in
demonstrations. In addition, the number of testimonies regarding the brutality of the
regime became increasingly more frequent and disturbing to hear as the security forces
were becoming more ruthless by the day as several accounts described how they opened
fire on anyone without taking care if there were women and young children present.
According to a dataset from the Political Terror Scale, for the year 2011 the repression
tactics of the Syrian regime were coded as the highest level five. This means that the
level of terror and brutality encompassed the majority of the population and those in
powers have no qualms with utilizing any means necessary to subdue their opposition. 225
This is in stark contrast to the Bahraini regimes code of a level three in which more
arbitrary arrests and unfair trials took place instead of such abhorrent uses of force
against their own citizens.
But despite the escalation in the level of brutality, the protests continued to go on
even as the government engaged in mass torture and ongoing killings of unarmed
demonstrators and defenseless civilians. By June, a group of defectors from the Syrian
Army announced the formation of the Khalid bin Walid Brigade that fought against
members of the Syrian security forces. One resident of the Bab Sba’ village told Human
Rights Watch that, “these committees that are formed by neighborhood youths are here to
Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke and Daniel Arnon, The Political Terror Scale
1976-2015 (2015), http://www.politicalterrorscale.org.
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protect us from the shabiha shooting randomly at us; to ensure that security forces do not
kill us while we protest.” 226 Therefore, many civilians supported and justified these
assaults as they were carried out with good intentions to defend the peaceful protesters
right to assembly as they were consistently met with unlawful attacks by the security
forces. The formation of such groups highlights the fact that the repression tactics
adopted by the Syrian regime had resulted in a dangerous escalation of violence and by
the end of this phase of the uprising a large number of military defectors had organized
themselves into the “Free Syrian Army”. 227
The increased severity in the indiscriminate and violent repression tactics carried
out by the Syrian regime’s various security forces differs from the Bahraini regime’s use
of force as by this time in the small Gulf country, the type of repression that was carried
out was no where near the gross level of violence inflicted by the al-Assad regime against
unarmed protesters and innocent bystanders. In addition, this caused the number of cheap
anti-government signals in the Syrian case to be significantly greater compared to the few
instances in which external actors denounced the Bahraini regimes actions. This is why
no armed anti-government groups were established in Bahrain but explains why they
formed in Syria. As the continued use of indiscriminate and violent repression persecuted
the politically neutral masses as well as the anti-regime dissidents it caused them to join
and support these armed opposition groups as they offered some protection from the
government. 228 As the signals from external actors remained cheap anti-government ones,
it sent a clear message to the opposition that they would most likely receive support from
their international allies should the uprising escalate even further. When this happens, it
decreases the likelihood that dissidents will back down as the opposition now has the
confidence needed to start to facilitate their attacks against the government’s troops. 229
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Whereas the signals from external actors throughout the Bahraini uprising had the
opposite effect as they were cheap, pro-government ones that deterred open hostilities
from transforming into a more dangerous situation.
So far, the escalation theory of civil war onset accurately describes how the
situation in Syria was on the path towards the onset of civil war. As Jeff Goodwin stated
in his book, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991,
“Armed insurgencies result from the violent suppression of the peaceful political
activities of aggrieved people who have the capacity and opportunity to rebel.” 230
Signaling theory also provided the backbone in understanding how third parties can also
effect the momentum of protest movements towards the onset of civil war. When the
regimes repression tactics are indiscriminate and violent it prompts external actors to
send signals of support in an offensive way to regime challengers, making them more
willing to engage in violent clashes with the state now that they feel they have the
backing from their international allies. 231 And as the uprising progressed onwards it only
continued to head down the inevitable path towards the onset of civil war.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This thesis set out to explore the reasons behind the vastly different outcomes of
the Arab Spring uprisings that took place in Bahrain and Syria. The independent variable
of repression and the intermediate variable of signals from external actors were examined
to see if they were the causal mechanisms that effected whether or not the momentum of
the protest movements would lead to civil war onset or not. The two hypotheses put forth
sought to show how the specific type (violent/nonviolent) and target
(selective/indiscriminate) of repression combined with whether or not the signals from
external actors were made in favor of the government or its opposition mattered in
predicting instances in which a protest movement will metastasize to the onset of civil
war.
Empirical Findings
The main findings that are thoroughly discussed throughout Chapter 4 and 5
clearly indicate that the type and target of repression are important precursors to monitor
in assessing whether an uprising is in grave danger of escalating to civil war onset. It also
showed how the type and intensity of repression impacted the kind of signals sent from
external actors in regards to whether or not they were in favor of the regime or its
opposition and whether they were cheap or costly which also contributed to impacting the
direction of the protest movements.
In Bahrain, the results indicated how the initial use of indiscriminate and violent
repression techniques upped the momentum of the protests as many more politically
neutral and disengaged citizens decided to become actively involved in the anti-regime
demonstrations. But interestingly enough, the signals from external actors during this
period did not overtly condemn the violent aggression towards unarmed protesters and
merely offered support to the ruling al-Khalifa family. The international community
simply suggested that the government engage in a national dialogue with its’ dissidents
instead of continuing to use violent force against them. Although King Hamad took this
advice, people’s anger was still growing due to the initial use of violent and
indiscriminate repression tactics that continued to drive more civilians to the streets in
protest. As time passed and no meaningful negotiations had been reached and the
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demonstrators were only becoming more disruptive, the Bahraini regime’s security forces
retreated back to their old methods as before. But this time, when they carried out their
violent repression tactics they were more selective rather than indiscriminate in nature
and they also conducted more nonviolent and indiscriminate techniques as well such as
their mass arrest campaign. Therefore, this caused the signals from external actors to only
mildly denounced the regimes repression tactics and they still remained reluctant to
overtly condemn the government as a whole. Instead, prominent external actors kept
offering their support to the Bahraini regime, letting the leaders know that they would be
willing to step in on their side, should the situation get further out of hand.
While in Syria, the findings emphasize how the continued use of indiscriminate
and violent repression methods which increased the number of cheap, anti-regime signals
led to the onset of civil war. Initially, both regimes responded to the uprisings with
violent and indiscriminate repression, but the difference is that the Syrian regime never
chose to abandon these methods as the Bahraini authorities finally did. Because of this,
many statements were made in support of the oppositional forces in Syria that alluded to
the fact that they would receive backing from third parties should the situation continue
to devolve. In this case, as the regime continued on its violent killing spree, not bothering
to take into account who was going to be hurt, injured or killed by the security forces it
only upped the momentum of the protest movements to the onset of civil war as armed
anti-government groups started to form throughout the country.
Theoretical Implications
The inflammation hypothesis within escalation theory states that the onset of civil
war is most likely when violent repression is carried out indiscriminately as it engenders
the majority of the population to engage in actively demonstrating against the unjust
measures being carried out by the state. While signaling theory predicts that when this
type and target of repression is carried out it causes external actors to send cheap antigovernment signals that cause the opposition to become more unwilling to reach mutual
negotiations with the state as they believe that they have third party support should the
regime continue to clamp down on their nonviolent activities. Both theories accurately
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account for the reasons why Syria fell victim to an ongoing civil war while Bahrain was
able to whether the storm.
Recommendations for Future Research
This thesis hopes to have added valuable findings to the civil war onset literature
which will help policy makers and crisis prevention teams better predict not only where
civil wars are likely to take place, but when. Repression type and whom it targets are
crucial elements to be aware of when monitoring an escalating situation but it is also
important to keep in mind that no longer are civil wars to be thought of as a merely
domestic phenomenon and the roles of the international community can also effect rising
tensions within countries as well.
Concluding Remarks
As civil wars have been the number one type of conflict for several years now,
understanding the vast complexities believed to trigger this type of intrastate violence are
crucial now more than ever. This thesis hopes to have added valuable information
regarding more understudied factors that can also lead to this type of warfare.
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